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ABSTRACT 
 The 2015 National Security Strategy warns that natural hazards supercharged by 
the effects of climate change pose a direct threat to the human and national security of the 
United States. This thesis asks if the U.S. government is placing the American public at 
risk by failing to create resilience standards appropriate to the threats posed by natural 
hazards, including hazards that will be exacerbated by climate change. What is 
preventing the nation from understanding the risk of climate security threats and the need 
to adapt to those threats? What lessons can the United States learn from our allies to 
establish an effective climate change adaptation protocol? These questions are examined 
through four emergency management considerations: the climate threat, presidential 
narratives, emergency management laws and relevant policies, and democratic allies’ 
climate adaptation progress. The research shows that decisive national leadership toward 
climate adaptation is urgently needed in the United States. The answers to these research 
questions provide a narrow view of key factors that can be changed to achieve a more 
resilient nation and increase public safety for the American people. 
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The United States of America has a real problem with climate change. While the 
concept of climate change may be straightforward, the problems associated with its causes 
and effects, remedies, and necessary adaptations are incredibly complex. Today, climate 
change has become a deeply controversial topic despite scientific consensus on its origins 
and its looming catastrophic threat. 
Alarming as it is globally, climate change has also been recognized as a threat to 
the national security of the United States. Is the U.S. government fulfilling its obligation to 
ensure the “safety and security of the American people” by creating resilience standards 
that adequately guard against this known and growing threat?1 This thesis examines the 
factors that are preventing the nation from understanding and adapting to climate security 
threats by exploring the intersection between climate security and emergency management. 
Federal, state, and local emergency management is concerned with the safety of the public 
before, during, and after disasters. Framed by qualitative literature on the climate threat 
itself, this thesis examines how presidential narratives have affected sustainable leadership 
on climate change action, the effect of public policy that supports climate adaptation, and 
how adaptation measures in the United States compare to our global allies such as Canada 
and the European Union. 
The effects of climate change are already surfacing, and unchecked emissions 
(pollutants) spell an increasing prediction for catastrophic global impacts. Today, intense 
storms and heat waves are rare. However, predictive modeling shows a grim future for 
many regions: extensive, persisting droughts; heatwaves that force the land to absorb ever 
more heat, creating intolerable temperatures for humans and livestock; intensified 
rainstorms that drop incredible amounts of water in short periods of time; and more 
frequent and destructive storm systems. The result will be forced migration from impacted 
areas around the world, reduced quantity and quality of sustainable food crops, 
                                                 
1 Department of Homeland Security, The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (Washington, 
DC: DHS, 2014), 8, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2014-qhsr-final-508.pdf. 
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undependable fresh water resources, and higher temperatures that will change growing 
seasons and modify pestilence and disease. And these are only some of the known 
implications of climate-induced weather extremes.  
Climate change is included in numerous national threat analyses from the 
Department of Defense, the Director of National Intelligence, the Department of Homeland 
Security, and the National Intelligence Council. However, presidential narratives over the 
past few decades have shown great power to shape public discussion and policy 
implications about climate change. Federal agencies exist to implement public policy that 
is dependent upon laws, regulations, and executive directives. Since the emergency 
management community is most interested in safety, this thesis briefly examines the laws 
that guide emergency management grants and the use of minimum standards. Land use and 
building codes are particularly critical to this discussion, yet these areas of public policy 
are not keeping up with current public safety needs, much less with the future impacts of 
climate change. Additionally, there is very little public discourse about the known risks of 
climate change, even though severe weather events are becoming more frequent and 
intense. Still, the United States does not have a national climate adaptation policy that 
drives federal guidance.  
Canada shares many climate-related threats with the United States, as well as some 
historical presidential narratives. However, Canada is approaching these threats 
proactively; the country is encouraging discourse across its territories—addressing 
challenges unique to each area—and actively promoting climate adaptation activities. The 
European Union also has many geologic, geographic, and meteorological similarities with 
the United States. However, membership in the European Union is voluntary; the EU laws 
that govern climate adaptation are codified by law through membership, which creates 
willingness to achieve progress.  
Through research and analysis, the thesis concludes that the United States is not 
doing enough to protect the public from the effects of climate change—not just the direct 
impacts, but also the cascading consequences from those impacts over time. For example, 
melting glaciers in the Antarctic and Greenland may have no bearing on weather in the 
United States; over time, however, these melting ancient waters will affect the salinity, 
xv 
density, temperature, currents, and volume of seas around the Earth. Consequently, the sea 
level in downtown Miami and the City of New York will rise on a daily basis—not just at 
high tide. The laws governing emergency management are not adequate to improve 
resilience in the face of this threat, and do not promote risk consciousness to climate 
security. Furthermore, there are no federal laws or regulations governing local land use or 
building code regulations; the guidance that does exist does not require decision-makers to 
use recent disaster data to improve their recommendations. After a disaster, the federal 
government—or the American taxpayer—pays to rebuild public infrastructure to pre-
disaster condition, reinforcing an unending cycle of risk. This is a significant gap in 
accountability. 
The United States has long embodied the fortitude and discipline that is 
synonymous with global leadership. But the most important lesson we can learn from our 
allies is to embrace a systemic policy path toward climate resilience. U.S. leadership at the 
federal level has avoided taking any such path. Using transparent scientific evidence, we 
must adopt a risk-based decision-making culture of preparedness. Climate change and its 
impacts have stymied this great nation. The American public, in its right for representation 
as the leader of democracy around the world, should expect—should demand—more to 
protect our children and all future generations.  
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[T]here’s one issue that will define the contours of this century more 
dramatically than any other, and that is the urgent and growing threat of a 
changing climate. 
—U.S. President Barack Obama , 
UN Climate Change Summit, September 23, 20141 
 
Important centers of authority in the U.S. government squarely recognize climate 
change as a security threat to the United States and its interests.2 Natural hazards 
supercharged by the effects of climate change pose a direct threat to human and national 
security, and intensified climate impacts—combined with persistent infrastructure 
decline—is increasing U.S. vulnerability to more catastrophic and complex disasters.3 
Despite scientific consensus, political divisiveness about climate change continues to 
enable this persistently growing and destabilizing threat.4 Although nations around the 
world are creating resilience to increasingly life-threatening and property-destroying 
events, the United States has not maintained a forward-looking climate change adaptation 
philosophy or sustainable climate resilience doctrine.5 
                                                 
1 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President at U.N. Climate Change Summit,” White House, 
September 23, 2014, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/23/remarks-president-
un-climate-change-summit.  
2 President of the United States, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2015), 
12, http://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/2015.pdf; Department of Defense (DoD), “National 
Security Implications of Climate-Related Risks and a Changing Climate,” RefID 8-6475571 (report, 
Department of Defense, May 2015), http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/150724-congressional-report-on-
national-implications-of-climate-change.pdf?source=govdelivery; “National Climate Assessment 2014,” 
U.S. Global Change Research Program, accessed September 20, 2017, http://nca2014.globalchange.gov/ 
report; Department of Homeland Security, The 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review (Washington, 
DC: DHS, 2014), 22, https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2014-qhsr-final-508.pdf. 
3 Aris Papadopoulos, Resilience: The Ultimate Sustainability (Miami, FL: Resilience Action Fund, 
2016), 26–29. 
4 Cary Funk and Brian Kennedy, “The Politics of Climate,” Pew Research Center, October 4, 2016, 
http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/10/04/the-politics-of-climate/. 
5 Richard Youngs, Climate Change and European Security (London: Routledge, 2015), 81; CNA 
Military Advisory Board, National Security and the Accelerating Risks of Climate Change (Alexandria, 
VA: CNA Corporation, 2014); Naomi Klein, This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. the Climate (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 2014). 
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A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Sophisticated predictive models illustrate a grim future for the climate into the 
twenty-second century.6 Although predicting the timing of future climate change effects is 
an imprecise science, most governments worldwide are focusing on complex action to 
backtrack the worst predicted impacts.7 Models show that weather patterns will be 
increasingly unpredictable, and that sever events will occur more frequently, at a great cost 
to society.8 These changes are expected to disrupt life-sustaining agricultural, hydrological, 
and biological dependencies as well.9 With a growing number of natural disasters and their 
worldwide implications, climate change is not simply a threat multiplier; soon, it is 
predicted to drive global instability and war.10 
Because the climate problem is inherently complex, this thesis only touches on the 
basic nature behind why there is a climate crisis; it focuses, instead, on the U.S. response 
to that crisis. Rather than focusing on differences of opinion, the thesis concentrates on the 
grim reality that adaptation will be necessary, and examines three core U.S. government 
considerations toward a climate-resilient future:  
1. Is the U.S. government placing the American public at risk by failing to 
create resilience standards appropriate to the threats posed by natural 
hazards, including hazards that will be exacerbated by climate change? 
2. What is preventing the nation from understanding the risk of climate 
security threats, and the need to adapt to those threats? 
                                                 
6 Patrick T. Brown and Ken Caldeira, “Greater Future Global Warming Inferred from Earth’s Recent 
Energy Budget,” Nature 552 (December 2017), https://www.nature.com/articles/nature24672.  
7 Gwynne Dyer, Climate Wars (Oxford, UK: Oneworld Publications, 2011), 85–96. 
8 Al Gore, An Inconvenient Sequel: Truth to Power (New York: Rodale, 2017), 311. 
9 National Research Council, A Safer Future: Reducing the Impacts of Natural Disasters (Washington, 
DC: National Academies Press, 1991), 21, https://www.nap.edu/read/1840/chapter/6; USGCRP, “National 
Climate Assessment,” sec. “Our Changing Climate.” 
10 USGCRP, “National Climate Assessment,” sec. “Widespread Impacts”; Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense (Energy, Installations & Environment), Department of Defense 2014 Climate Change 
Adaptation Roadmap (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2014), https://www.acq.osd.mil/eie/ 
downloads/CCARprint_wForward_e.pdf; CNA Risks of Climate Change. 
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3. What lessons can the United States learn from our allies to establish an 
effective climate change adaptation protocol? 
B. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research design for this thesis is a qualitative literature review. As the initial 
research began, four primary factors emerged; these factors are the qualitative lens through 
which this thesis was developed: 1) the climate threat, 2) the impact of presidential 
narratives on sustainable U.S. doctrine, 3) laws and regulatory mechanisms guiding 
emergency management and resilience, and 4) global attempts to address climate threats.  
Chapter II reviews literature that reveals four factors that affect climate change 
adaptation in the United States. It begins with credible U.S. government documents and 
other knowledgeable sources on the climate threat itself. Chapter III discusses the climate 
threat to the homeland and extrapolates the threat’s potential consequences through the 
twenty-first century. It focuses on key sectors and presents a comprehensive foundation 
that explains why the climate phenomenon is perceived by numerous security professionals 
as a threat to national security.   
Much of the climate research in Chapter III is derived from key U.S. departments 
and agencies that are responsible for homeland security. Because much data is derived from 
federal agencies, it is also linked to the Executive Office of the President of the United 
States. Chapter IV broadly discusses the national narrative about climate issues since the 
1970s, as led by presidential administrations. The chapter explores the administrations’ 
climate ideologies and their effects on national dialogue, continuity, and basic leadership 
for the American public.  
Chapter V demonstrates how presidential narratives have influenced climate-
related laws, regulations, and policies for federal agencies. Agencies implement new 
programs—and often change existing programs—with states, territories, tribes, and the 
American people through each administration. These are the tools through which doctrine 
becomes tangible. Despite the systemic checks and balances built into U.S. democracy, 
presidential doctrine can significantly influence public perception. Climate change itself is 
4 
an example of a national challenge that cannot maintain a consistent framework for action 
or resolution due to changing narratives from the Office of the President.  
Chapter VI compares the United States’ position on climate adaptation to the 
European Union and Canada. The United States has forged significant global agreements 
toward reversing the drivers of climate change and illuminating the importance of 
adaptation. Despite prominent international leadership on global matters following World 
War II, U.S. dogma has been inconsistent on climate change adaptation.11 In the absence 
of U.S. leadership on climate adaptation, this thesis explores climate adaptation progress 
in important democratic first-world allies.  
Chapter VII synthesizes the national security considerations of climate change, the 
laws and policies pertaining to climate adaptation and disasters, and the prospect of U.S. 
globalism versus nationalism to answer the research questions. While Chapter VII draws 
conclusions about national security considerations and regulations, Chapter VIII provides 
recommendations based on the overall findings in this thesis and suggestions for future 
research opportunities. 
                                                 
11 Ian Bremmer, “The Era of American Global Leadership Is Over,” TIME, December 19, 2016, 
http://time.com/4606071/american-global-leadership-is-over/.  
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
We need a Marshall Plan for the Earth. 
—Naomi Klein12 
 
This literature review is categorized by the four methodological filters for national 
security introduced in the previous chapter: the climate threat, presidential narratives, 
emergency management laws and relevant policies, and democratic allies’ climate 
adaptation progress. The research begins with governmental and independent sources that 
identify and contextualize the climate threat. A discussion of presidential narratives is 
followed by emergency management laws, as well as other regulations and policies that 
affect disaster management and resiliency. The fourth filter is a broad review of U.S. 
foreign allies and their challenges with climate adaptation. The literature review culminates 
with informative resources that help analyze the threat to national security.  
There is copious literature on the topic of climate change. Researching the specific 
topic of thesis was arduous; it required sorting critically through mass amounts of 
government publications, books, journals, and internet resources. Each presidential 
administration’s climate change philosophy was researched independently; the research 
became more specific when the problem was no longer a new scientific phenomenon, 
following the Reagan administration. National security publications reflect presidential 
narratives to varying degrees. The emergency management link to the national security 
threat of climate change is under-researched, especially as it connects to relevant doctrine 
governing policies.  
Climate adaptation is also explored through programs in other democratic first-
world countries. Although scholarly material is available on this topic, it is difficult to find 
and most of it is online. Because the research questions are topics of growing relevance 
and are much politicized, internet research is an important source for current news. 
                                                 
12 Klein, This Changes Everything, 5. 
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Furthermore, the research questions for this thesis are not static; the dialogue on the U.S. 
approach to climate change is constantly evolving.  
Although many resources were consulted in the development of this thesis, only 
the most fundamental are included in this short literature review. Other quality material 
from knowledgeable experts is included throughout the following chapters to demonstrate 
the credibility of the information and to support the reporting of past events.  
A. THE CLIMATE THREAT 
In Climate Wars, Gwynne Dyer writes a sobering account of the status of the world 
through the mid-twenty-first century.13 He describes climate change triggers, time 
horizons, political tensions, survival, and the long view of how deeply complex the climate 
problem is for the Earth and all its inhabitants. The book goes beyond a simple explanation 
of climate science, describing critical metrics and why they matter. He discusses relevant 
issues of global energy, fossil fuels, and the economic implications of action or inaction, 
along with the importance of global and U.S. food production and commodities resourcing 
as the world’s population continues to expand.   
Joshua Busby’s treatise Climate Change and National Security, written in 2007 as 
a report for the Council on Foreign Relations, explains, significantly, why these two issues 
are a combined concern.14 In his report, Busby captures the criticality that climate change 
threats are for the future. In the post–Hurricane Katrina era, Busby crystalizes that the 
climate threat has only just begun. The report argues the scale of the threat is not matched 
with adequate domestic policy or programs to secure the United States from the predicted 
escalation of future climate events. The report critically assesses global impacts, squarely 
placing humanitarian instability, government destabilization, and increased terrorism as 
important concerns for U.S. national security.  
                                                 
13 Dyer, Climate Wars. 
14 Joshua W. Busby, Climate Change and National Security: An Agenda for Action, CSR No. 32 (New 
York: Council of Foreign Relations, 2007), http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Climate 
Change_CSR32.pdf.  
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A decade later, many of Busby’s U.S. domestic and foreign policy assessments 
remain relevant. Busby calls for action on rising sea levels in high-risk coastal areas; he 
recommends creating an international military conference to set the tone for collaboration 
and information sharing; and, addressing infrastructure gaps, he recommends systemic 
mitigation and resilience integrated into both domestic and foreign policy. He challenges 
the status quo, claiming that fundamental change to existing climate governance is 
necessary, and he recommends creating senior-level advisors in the Office of the President, 
the National Security Council, and the Pentagon, as well as implementing Congressional 
oversight. These insights were partially realized during the Obama administration (2009–
2017), and provide guideposts for defining climate change as a national security threat. 
The first issue of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Quadrennial 
Homeland Security Review (published in 2010) includes climate change as an impending 
national security threat.15 At that time, national security continued to be influenced by a 
post-9/11 military defensive posture, or threat of domestic asymmetric warfare. The 
inclusion of climate change in the inaugural issue acknowledges the threat of natural 
hazards and pandemics to national security. The review states that climate change will 
intensify weather hazards and potentially instigate instability, war, and humanitarian crises, 
resulting in large movements of people. DHS further acknowledges this risk through its 
mission, which is built on five foundations—one of which disaster resilience. A sign of the 
times, the dialogue in the 2010 review filters this concept first through the prism of 
terrorism, but calls out disasters as a catch-all for intentional or unintentional domestic 
harm. This document stands with other significant government publications released 
through 2017 that connect the threat of climate change to national security, many of which 
are referenced in this thesis. 
In 2014, the third National Climate Assessment, a product of the U.S. Global 
Change Research Program (USGCRP), was released to the public.16 The digital publication 
                                                 
15 DHS, Quadrennial Homeland Security Review Report: A Strategic Framework for a Secure 
Homeland (Washington, DC: DHS, 2010). https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/qhsr_report.pdf.  
16 USGCRP, “National Climate Assessment.”  
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is a summary of the state of the climate, assembled by hundreds of panel experts and 
studiously peer reviewed under the umbrella of the U.S. federal government. Recalling 
Busby’s insight once again, the USGCRP was placed in the Office of the President, which 
gave significant lift to the program’s prestige. The report itself is a public-facing, online 
publication that describes the reasons behind and status of the global climate; it is broken 
down into five U.S. regions and interpreted for economic and social implications, and also 
gives recommendations for adaptation and mitigation actions. This report is significant 
because it shows wide federal support to coalesce state-of-the-art science. Its goal is 
making a complex topic easily digestible, enabling the public to understand the climate 
threat. The report uses plain language about the threats, their current effects, and future 
predictions. The website is an important source of current climate science.  
Peace Prize Nobel Lauriat and former Vice President of the United States Al Gore 
has written several books on climate change. In his most recent book, An Inconvenient 
Sequel: Truth to Power, Gore clearly explains the global threat climate change presents to 
all of humanity—indeed, life on Earth.17 He describes the climate’s potential to change 
weather in frightening future consequences, yet paints a hopeful outlook for humanity. He 
is optimistic that the human race can and will embrace his reality and act strategically to 
combat the most damaging effects for future generations. Gore illustrates this outlook 
through stories about renewable energy, and about communities that have benefited from 
new jobs and businesses. He discusses technological advancement that allow surplus 
energy to be stored for future use. Easily half of the book is dedicated to public engagement. 
He encourages education, activism, and commitment. His depth of understanding and 
summation of the core problem in simple terms is useful for this thesis; it captures the 
essence of a humanity faced with daunting challenges, but with hope for a positive 
outcome.   
                                                 
17 Gore, An Inconvenient Sequel.  
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B. PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATIONS AND THE NATIONAL 
NARRATIVE 
Amy Royden, a Harvard Law graduate and climate advocate, captures the 
principles of the William J. (Bill) Clinton administration on climate change in her 2002 
article, “U.S. Climate Change Policy under President Clinton: A Look Back.”18 She 
initially gives a brief snapshot of the two previous administrations’ (Reagan, 1981–1989, 
and Bush, 1989–1993) environmental postures to platform the Clinton era. Royden 
considers Clinton’s choice of Al Gore—a known environmentalist—for vice president a 
clear, early statement of the Clinton administration’s future policies. Dissecting the Clinton 
administration’s climate change narrative, Royden recounts key policy decisions and 
strategies, including the “Climate Change Action Plan” released within ten months of the 
new administration’s inauguration. Her comprehensive account of the administration’s 
deliberative intent to define a national dialogue on climate change provides balance to this 
thesis by sequencing the general mood during the administration, and why decisions in the 
following administration were so counter-intuitive at the time.  
Unfortunately, there is little officially archived material available about climate 
change or adaptation from the George W. Bush administration. However, the “Global 
Climate Change Policy Book” was released by the Bush White House in 2002.19 In its 
opening statement, the policy document reveals its premise: that economic prosperity will 
drive innovation and new technology, and the climate problem requires multi-generational 
solutions. The policy specifically calls for investments in climate and energy research; 
these initiatives, the document says, will help reveal fresh solutions that will take 
generations to address climate change.   
Armin Rosencranz, a Stanford University law professor, wrote a review of key 
climate-related developments during the Bush administration.20 Rosencranz is critical of 
                                                 
18 Amy Royden, “U.S. Climate Change Policy under President Clinton: A Look Back,” Golden Gate 
University Law Review 32, no. 4 (2002), http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol32/iss4/3.  
19 “Global Climate Change Policy Book,” White House, February 2002, https://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/02/climatechange.html.  
20 Armin Rosencranz, “U.S. Climate Change Policy under G.W. Bush,” Golden Gate University Law 
Review, 32, no. 4 (2002), http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol32/iss4/4.  
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the administration’s rejection of the Kyoto Protocol, a pioneering global climate change 
agreement crafted in large part by the Clinton administration, soon after his inauguration. 
Rosencranz claims this was a declarative position that would remain throughout Bush’s 
presidency, and he discusses pre-existing disagreements between U.S. and European Union 
(EU) policy that strongly influenced Bush’s position on U.S. action. Rosencranz discusses 
the justification of the Kyoto abandonment, which he believes set an important precedent 
for U.S. climate policy—one that continues to be a cornerstone of opposition to U.S. 
participation in global agreements to this day.  
In June 2013, President Barack Obama issued The President’s Climate Action 
Plan.21 It clearly outlines a comprehensive path forward for the nation to address climate 
change and its predicted impacts. Three primary objectives of the plan were to reduce fossil 
fuel emissions, create more awareness of climate change impact and take steps toward 
climate adaptation, and engage U.S. leadership on global climate change solutions. The 
plan addresses various sectors, including fuel economy, clean energy, and energy 
efficiency, and discusses moderating toxic gases released into the atmosphere. Also 
included is discussion about infrastructure investments, and government-provided climate 
science to further advance state, tribal, and local leadership awareness. These goals set the 
nation on a collective course toward implementation of climate change policy.  
Early in the Donald J. Trump administration (2017), scholarly material on an 
official climate policy is unavailable. That is not to say, however, that digital information 
is lacking; Trump’s opinions during his candidacy—and his official actions as a new 
president—were relayed in tweets. Indeed, there is a huge amount of discussion by special 
interests about the pros and cons of an unofficial Trump climate policy. Columbia Law 
School designed and maintains the Climate Deregulation Tracker, which records any 
climate regulations that Trump changes or eliminates.22 Outside of the declaration of an 
                                                 
21 Executive Office of the President, The President’s Climate Action Plan (Washington, DC: White 
House, June 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/image/president27sclimate 
actionplan.pdf. 
22 “Climate Deregulation Tracker,” Columbia Law School, accessed September 8, 2017, 
http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/resources/climate-deregulation-tracker/all-updates/. 
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official climate policy, this website specifically records Trump’s official actions on climate 
policy as president. One of the most significant documents of the Trump presidency is the 
issuance of Executive Order 13783, Promoting Energy Independence and Economic 
Growth.23 This order effectively reversed many of the Obama-era climate change 
adaptation actions, including rescinding—not superseding—The President’s Climate 
Action Plan.  
C. REGULATIONS, LAWS, AND POLICY 
Federal policies, laws, and regulations can be complex, and sometimes 
contradictory. Laws can be newly created in response to standing policy for major disasters 
that require federal assistance, to allow more flexibility. In 2017, the Congressional 
Research Service published Federal Disaster Assistance Response and Recovery 
Programs: Brief Summaries to give an up-to-date snapshot of relevant disaster policy.24 
This document recaps programs offered by the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) and other agencies that were triggered by disaster declaration. While this report 
addresses emergency laws, regulations, and policy for disaster assistance, it does not 
address non-disaster topics that have an effect on resiliency.  
Disasters in the United States was published in 2017 and jointly written by Vera 
Brusentsev and Wayne Vroman.25 It provides a comprehensive look at the frequency and 
cost of disasters in the United States today. The book covers federal assistance programs 
as well as public- and private-sector insurance, and culminates by examining how disasters 
affect American job markets, and their overall economic impact in the United States. While 
the climate threat section of this book is relevant to this thesis, even more so are its 
discussions about the threat’s cost to the nation, and what it means to national security.  
                                                 
23 Donald J. Trump, Promoting Energy Independence and Economic Growth, Executive Order 13783 
(Washington, DC: White House, March 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/03/28/ 
presidential-executive-order-promoting-energy-independence-and-economi-1. 
24 Maria Kreiser, Maura Mullins, and Jared C. Nagel, Federal Disaster Assistance Response and 
Recovery Programs: Brief Summaries, CRS Report No. RL31734 (Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service, 2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL31734.pdf. 
25 Vera Brusentsev and Wayne Vroman, Disasters in the United States (Kalamazoo, MI: WE Upjohn 
Institute, 2017). 
12 
Aris Papadopoulos is a passionate resilience advocate who studied engineering at 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and business at Harvard University.26 In 
his book, Resilience: The Ultimate Sustainability, he clearly takes aim at the building 
industry. His thesis is that critical fundamentals driving building policy in the United States 
are subpar, and greatly contribute to the reason the country faces substantial disaster losses. 
The book—which is well-researched and contains numerous comparative statistics—offers 
a behind-the-scenes view of the economic drivers that keep the building code system 
largely unregulated; it reveals deep vulnerabilities in the U.S. housing system, caused by 
an emphasis on cost savings, that are largely unaddressed in the public eye. A 2016 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report recommended that building code 
standards and designs committees consult climate experts when determining code 
standards.27 This report, requested by Congress, queries the sources that inform final code 
standards and recommendations. The investigators found that there is little cross-
collaboration with federal agencies to effectively determine if the codes and standards are 
sufficient to meet today’s climate threats.  
In “Historical Overview of the American Land Use System,” Pace University law 
professor John R. Nolan contributes to this discussion about U.S. communities’ 
vulnerabilities.28 Nolan provides an in-depth look into the federal, state, and local 
governments’ roles in determining land use; governmental involvement is a core element 
of resilient design for local communities—from business sectors to housing—when 
considering natural hazards. Nolan’s work illustrates, however, that federal and state 
oversight allow little local control, and little accountability, which contributes to the 
communities’ vulnerabilities when natural hazards occur.  
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D. CLIMATE ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED STATES, EUROPEAN 
UNION, AND CANADA 
According to Cinnamon P. Carlarne, a professor of law and expert in climate 
change policy, the United States was a strong global frontrunner in climate initiatives under 
the Clinton administration.29 However, in the following Bush years, the United States 
scaled back its involvement in climate initiatives and global coordination. As a result, the 
European Union emerged as a leader in climate initiatives. Carlarne’s book Climate 
Change Law and Policy is full of important historical information that offers detailed 
accounts from a global perspective. She primarily focuses on the United States and 
European Union, but intertwines global advancements and setbacks that contributed to U.S. 
and EU policies.  
Richard Youngs, in his book Climate Change and European Security, claims the 
European Union has only recently begun to incorporate climate concerns into its national 
security dialogue and preparations.30 Youngs provides a sobering look at the very real 
security concerns climate change presents and has informed this thesis deeply on the 
subject. Most international climate programs coordinate on some level with the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which has two 
fundamental activities toward addressing climate change: mitigation and adaptation.31 The 
UNFCCC also hosts the Conference of the Parties, whose members form the working 
committees that develop global agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol (1997) and the 
Paris Agreement (2016).  
Through the Obama presidency, the United States participated in global strategies 
to prepare for climate change. In 2013, Obama issued Executive Order 13653, which 
mandated the first legal requirement for federal agencies to develop and submit climate 
                                                 
29 Cinnamon P. Carlarne, Climate Change Law and Policy (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 
2010). 
30 Youngs, Climate Change. 
31 United Nations Climate Change, accessed September 17, 2017, https://unfccc.int/; “Background,” 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, accessed September 27, 2017, 
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adaptation plans.32 These plans—which were only one of several climate actions discussed 
in the order—were to outline how federal agencies would begin a coordinated effort to 
prepare for climate instability. This executive order was an attempt to bring adaptation into 
the U.S. dialogue through action planning not only in the agency’s footprint, but through 
its authorized programs. In 2015, the Congressional Research Service issued a report that 
provided Congress with a review of the adaptation plans.33 This analysis provides a helpful 
view of the government’s ability to provide risk analysis for its own agencies, and 
Congress’s role in providing performance metrics.  
Today, Canada embraces a climate-friendly approach that encompasses adaptation 
and climate dialogue. The government of Canada hosts a Federal Adaptation Policy 
Framework for Climate Change website, which is available to the public.34 Canada also 
demonstrates concern about the sociological and economic impacts of climate change, and 
various online sources reveal Canada’s approach to climate change.35  
E. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
The threat that climate change poses to U.S. national security was discussed, also, 
in a 2014 report assembled by a board of advisers consisting of sixteen retired leaders from 
the armed services.36 In the report, the board members express forthright concern over 
inaction from the United States and other nations to address the climate change threat. In 
Climatic Cataclysm, Kurt M. Campbell’s collection of essays articulates why foreign 
                                                 
32 Barack Obama, Preparing the United States for the Impacts of Climate Change, Executive Order 
13653 (Washington, DC: White House, November 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/ 
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33 Jane A. Leggett, Climate Change Adaptation by Federal Agencies: An Analysis of Plans and Issues 
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34 “Federal Adaptation Policy Framework for Climate Change,” Government of Canada, last modified 
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policy and national security are inseparable components of climate change dialogue.37 
Prominent authors contributed to this book, with a specific eye toward the climate threat to 
national security; its purpose is to underscore that climate change will be a brutal, 
persistent, and unabated threat that requires actionable climate policy. Similarly, National 
Public Radio (NPR) interviewed Michael Masters, a senior vice president at the prominent 
international security organization The Soufan Group, soon after Hurricane Harvey in 
September 2017.38 Martin asserts that natural hazards are a growing threat to national 
security because they create vulnerability.  
In general, the research shows scientific consensus that human activity is causing 
global warming, resulting in a changing climate and related impacts. NASA’s Global 
Climate Change webpage emphasizes the importance of consensus, referencing scientific 
establishments that further underscore consensus on the science by independent bodies.39 
The United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) is an independent 
resource that, in some respects, acts as a high-level clearinghouse of historical and 
emergent data and information.40 Nations from around the world participate in the IPCC 
assessment reports, which are published every seven years and contain the latest climate-
related information to guide decision-makers on global policy.41 A highly structured 
process, material is researched and peer-reviewed under strict protocols by leading scholars 
and subject-matter professionals.42 When it comes to consensus, the IPCC has achieved 
unanimous agreement by its authors on all assessments released to date. Thus, it is the true 
benchmark. 
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When it comes to consensus, however, one of the most important recent findings is 
a peer-reviewed article by James Cook et al. titled “Consensus on Consensus: A Synthesis 
of Consensus Estimates on Human-Caused Global Warming.”43 Cook’s team compiled 
more than 11,900 research papers from global science scholars, of which 97 percent agreed 
that the planet is warming due to human civilization. The study sparked considerable 
commentary, from political proselyting to outright dissent.44 Despite the 97-percent 
consensus in Cook et al.’s study, the degree to which the climate is changing—and the 
timeline of impacts—is another subject for independent study. Future research should 
investigate how, in an age of science, climate science has become weaponized by 
opinion—to the point of influencing or stagnating meaningful dialogue—when the risk is 
so great. Another important avenue for future research is how messaging, especially in an 
age so saturated by information, influences public perception from climate professionals 
and political influencers. This exemplifies why an apolitically neutral forum for scientific 
consensus is necessary.  
As identified in this research, climate change has been acknowledged as a threat—
at least on some level—by U.S. presidents over the last half-century. As such, there is no 
identifiable peer-reviewed consensus arguing against it. However, this lack of rigorous 
academic evidence underscores why opinion and narrative play an important role in the 
leadership and direction of the United States. Prior to the 2016 presidential election, Donald 
Trump had espoused the idea that climate change was “created by and for the Chinese in 
order to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive.”45 On numerous occasions, Trump 
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used social media to denounce global warming as a “hoax” or “nonsense.”46 When he was 
elected as the new U.S. president, he continued to espouse this opposing view: when his 
administration released its first National Security St5rategy in December 2017, the 
document officially eliminated climate change as a national security threat, sparking 
significant controversy across major media.47 Within weeks, 106 members of the House of 
Representatives signed onto a letter noting the omission and asking the White House to 
reinsert climate change as a national security threat based on scientific evidence.48 As of 
today, the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy has not been revised.  
There are ample and emergent resources rich with information about climate 
instability and national security. This thesis explores the connection between the climate 
change threat and national security, and how it intersects with the emergency management 
community, in an attempt to find key vulnerabilities that expose the United States to natural 
disasters, which in turn may complicate the very resilience we are seeking to achieve. 
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III. THE CLIMATE THREAT 
Climate change is a global problem with serious implications, 
environmental, social, economic, political, and for the distribution of goods; 
it represents one of the principal challenges facing humanity in our day. 
—Pope Francis, Laudato Si, May 24, 201549 
 
Climate change is an expanding threat to civilian and national security interests, 
stemming from changes to the Earth’s physical systems.50 When overproduced, certain 
emissions from human society and natural processes alter the Earth’s ability to regulate 
itself in ways familiar to mankind. Today, mainstream science consistently submits that 
persistent concentration of emissions destabilizes the atmosphere and is not abating 
effectively enough to stop reactive planetary processes.51 The increasing emissions are a 
catalyst for making the Earth hotter. Higher Earth temperatures cause mankind to 
experience more severe weather and other threats that are progressively violent and 
unforgiving. Severe weather is occurring with increasing frequency, which is a clear signal 
that the Earth is approaching a point at which human intervention to reverse the damage is 
increasingly unattainable.52 The IPCC calls this a tipping point.53  
The tipping point occurs when carbon dioxide equivalents (all greenhouse gases) 
in the atmosphere reach a nexus with the higher temperature of the Earth. When the tipping 
point is reached, it will trigger catastrophic weather and other consequences that mankind 
cannot reverse.54 Think of it as a dew point—when the temperature and humidity reach a 
certain point, it will rain. In the language of climate change, a tipping point is when the 
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Earth will drive its own intensified outcomes through positive feedback loops.55 Positive 
feedback loops are essentially Earth’s own cascading reactions to the chemical imbalance 
on a planetary scale. The following are just a few examples of feedback loops: 
• Warm oceans produce abundant evaporation, increasing atmospheric 
water vapor. When overproduced, water vapor becomes a greenhouse gas 
because it traps even more heat in the sky, which forces more ocean 
heating, evaporation, and water vapor. It becomes its own cycle of 
reinforcement, resulting in more negative impacts to the Earth’s weather. 
• As the Earth warms, the massive melting of ice sheets and glaciers is 
problematic because the ice helps to regulate planetary temperatures and 
other important stabilizing processes. When liquid water replaces the 
reflective capacity of ice to send heat into space, the open water absorbs 
over 90 percent of sunlight as heat, thereby sustaining yet another 
feedback loop to manifest even more heat.56  
• Melting ice and thawing tundra release incredible amounts of previously 
frozen methane hydrate into the atmosphere. This gas is twenty-two times 
more potent than CO2, and further unleashes massive stores of fossilized 
CO2.57 The Siberian bog, for example, contains 70 billion tons of methane 
gas and it started melting in 2005.58  
• Ocean algae, such as kelp, are a biological necessity for life on Earth as 
they produce huge amounts of oxygen and help regulate ocean acidity.59 
Algae need iron-rich soils blown from land into the seas. Farming methods 
today interfere with this process. Oceans are converting massive amounts 
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of CO2 into carbonic acid faster than predicted, which erodes a healthy 
food web.60 Without a healthy food web, the oceans cannot support simple 
or complex organisms. Challenged by overfishing for human food supply, 
ocean acidification illustrates a grim future. 
• Oceans are considered by scientists to behave as vast carbon sinks capable 
of absorbing excess CO2. Because of the accelerating acidification, the 
oceans have already exhausted almost fifty percent of their absorption 
capacity.61  
Many of these feedback loops are already well underway, along with numerous other 
climate change manifestations. And, again, these are only a few examples of the 
implications of increased planetary heat and outcomes pushing the Earth toward the tipping 
point. In 1988, the IPCC determined the tipping point to be 2 degrees Celsius above pre-
industrial times, roughly circa 1800.62 Pre-industrial carbon dioxide (CO2) atmospheric 
concentrations were approximately 280 parts per million (ppm).63  
This discussion is important because this tipping point (2 degrees Celsius above 
pre-industrial times) was identified as a global limit after which the feedback loops would 
become self-propelled on an intractable superhighway to climate Armageddon. James A. 
Hansen, former director of the Goddard Space Institute at NASA, alarmed Congress when 
he claimed that the worst effects may be avoidable if global CO2 concentrations stop at 
400 ppm.64 That was thirty years ago. The IPCC has since raised the ceiling to 450 ppm 
and changed the global target, with some acceptable planetary impact, to 350 ppm. The 
thinking goes that the Earth’s climate will stabilize around CO2 concentrations at 350 ppm. 
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CO2 concentrations in the atmosphere today are 407 ppm (see Figure 1).65 Projections 
indicate that human intervention would require as much as a 90- percent reduction in 
current levels of CO2 concentration emissions to cap at 450 ppm by the year 2050.66 The 
take-away is alarming.  
 
Figure 1. Carbon Dioxide Monthly Measurement67 
Scientists agree that the climate is responding to higher levels of gases that retain 
heat in the atmosphere, and their impacts are being felt around the world, as shown in 
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Figure 2.68 Current CO2 exceeds measurable levels over the past 450,000 years.69 Climate 
models through the year 2100 illustrate an alarming picture of unpredictability and 
harshness that will be quite different from the era of relative climate stability that 
accompanied the rise of humanity throughout our recorded history.70 As a result, the 
intensifying weather is predicted to increase in severity well into the next century, 
manifested by areas of exceptional drought, longer and more intense periods of extreme 
heat, rain bombs, hotter and larger wildfires, larger tropical cyclones, severe storms and 
flooding, including blizzards and ice storms, among other threats.71 Climate threats are 
dangerous force-multipliers to existing vulnerabilities.72  
                                                 
68 USGCRP, “National Climate Assessment,” sec. “Supplemental Message 1.”  
69 “Graphic: The Relentless Rise of Carbon Dioxide,” NASA, accessed June 5, 2018, https://climate. 
nasa.gov/climate_resources/24/graphic-the-relentless-rise-of-carbon-dioxide/. 
70 Gore, An Inconvenient Sequel, 36. 
71 Gore, 36.  
72 Youngs, Climate Change, 38. 
24 
 
Figure 2. Dramatic Increase of Atmospheric Carbon Dioxide from Ice Core 
and Direct Atmospheric Measurements since the Industrial Age73 
The effects of climate change on national security will challenge the emergency 
management community. Due to the rapid change in risk, science is hard-pressed to provide 
accurate risk-exposure estimates to leaders and decision–makers.74 Because observations 
have been recorded for a long time, the manifestations of climate change can be measured. 
For instance, the change in average sea level over the past thirty years is attributed to an 
overall reduction in global ice coverage, as well as seawater expansion from increasing 
average temperatures (see Figure 3).75 Changes in sea level have enormous consequences 
for the built environment on the coast; they increase the threat of flooding and expose entire 
coastal communities to flood and storm surge hazards. 
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Figure 3. Change in Sea level as Measured by Satellite from 1993 to 201776 
The primary impacts of severe weather are immediate. Figure 4 compares the average 
number of flood days per year in several coastal U.S. cities from 1950 to the 2010s. The 
data show a dramatic change. As homes are flooded, residents are forced to flee; they may 
be forced to find safe shelter until damages can be determined, and cleanup and restoration 
operations render the community safe for return. Temporary housing in an alternate and 
safe location is difficult for the evacuees and expensive for the federal government. Schools 
are frequently used as temporary shelters for survivors, which disrupts their primary 
functions. Roads and bridges may be washed away. Commuters’ work and home schedules 
are disrupted until repairs are completed. Nursing home residents are placed at higher risk 
of death and complex illnesses from loss of electricity, or the distress caused by 
evacuation.77 Disruptions are pervasive and affect nearly everyone in some way—whether 
                                                 
76 Source: “Vital Signs: Sea Level,” NASA, accessed August 14, 2018, https://climate.nasa.gov/vital-
signs/sea-level/.  
77 Aaron C. Davis et al., “Moving Florida’s Many Seniors out of Irma’s Path Has Unique Risks,” 




they are deadly, expensive, or inconvenient—and many who are affected will never 
recover.78 
 
Figure 4. The Average Number of Flood Days per Year, for a Collection of 
American Cities79 
Secondary effects or cascading impacts triggered by the primary event can be 
cumulative and can result in catastrophic long-term consequences for the community. 
Simply stated, climate change–induced impacts have the ability to exacerbate existing 
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weaknesses, turning them into progressively more catastrophic events.80 These are the 
impacts that can be persistent and have long-term effects if community functions and a 
sense of normality are not restored fairly quickly. For example, essential services such as 
running water, electricity, sewage treatment, and garbage pickup are basic necessities to 
resume normality. Tangible tax base elements are critical, such as people returning to work 
and companies resuming production. The private sector understands the cost of long 
recovery periods and the risk associated with businesses’ recovery. Each day a company 
cannot recover operational capacity increases the likelihood that the business will fail. 
Small businesses impacted by disaster have almost a 40 percent failure rate and 25 percent 
cannot survive a year after impact.81 When businesses fail, communities lose an important 
element that powers the local economy. 
Consider secondary impacts that threaten entire sectors of society if recovery 
cannot take place quickly to restore balance. These are the climate impacts feared most by 
national security professionals, and they present the direst threats to human security itself.82 
Impacts range from reliability of basic life sustenance, such as food and water, to the 
increased vulnerability of coastal communities that could lead to unprecedented voluntary 
and forced migration.83 As climate change impacts intensify, each community will be 
affected in some way depending on its unique “climate sensitivity.”84 Neighboring 
communities will also be affected, as they face pressure on their own resources to feed, 
water, and shelter their devastated neighbor. Less stable areas may be unable to absorb the 
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added pressure posed by migration, triggering backlash that may manifest in civil unrest or 
outright conflict.85 
Take the Syrian refugee crisis, for example, which has been described as a climate 
change–induced tragedy.86 Intense and persistent drought from 2006 to 2010 caused 
widespread crop failures and food shortages.87 Nearly 60 percent of Syria’s land became 
desertified, accompanied by an 80-percent loss of livestock by 2009.88 Culminating in civil 
unrest from food and water shortages, urban areas became hotbeds of friction. This 
instability contributed to volatility and political crisis. Already situated in a high-risk area, 
the events became an opportunity for terrorists to expand from neighboring Iraq. This was 
the way the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria came to be. Ultimately, the people of Syria 
sought escape from what became the Syrian Civil War, resulting in mass migration across 
Europe.89 Filippo Grandi, the United Nations high commissioner for refugees, claimed, 
“Syria is the biggest humanitarian and refugee crisis of our time.”90 Indeed, the climate 
sensitivity of the area rendered Syria tragically vulnerable to a humanitarian disaster that 
was felt by numerous other nations, especially in Europe, and even the United States.91 
James A. Clapper, former director of National Intelligence and the Department of 
Defense, reported to Obama that climate threats are becoming increasingly dangerous to 
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U.S. national security.92 Threats by climate change include instances of persistent extreme 
drought, coastal sea-level rise (refer back to Figure 2), intensification of torrential rains, 
increasingly frequent flooding (Figure 4), more frequent and intense heat waves, a growing 
frequency of wildfire and wildland-urban interface fires, an expansion of vector-borne 
diseases, and domestic and international mass migration that trigger global instability and 
international conflict.93 While these threats exist today, climate change will continue to be 
a “threat multiplier,” increasing the likelihood as well as the magnitude of the impacts.94  
A. HOMELAND SECURITY 
National security interests in climate change are not unique to the United States.95 
The preceding discussion illustrates that weather and climate have significant effects on 
societal, civil, and fiscal circumstances worldwide.96 As previously established, scientists 
are projecting weather and climate extremes in the near future that may have severe threats 
to the security of the United States and other nations.97 This concern is putting increased 
pressure on governments around the world to provide a viable path forward that will allow 
citizens and societies to thrive under severe pressures forced by climate change.98  
Societal vulnerability is rooted in the strength of socio-economic and built 
environments to protect our livelihoods.99 Given our vulnerabilities, as well as how costly 
it is to recover from natural disasters, it is unclear if the United States has enough economic 
resilience to withstand an intensifying disaster response scenario.100 The plots in Figure 5 
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show the number of annual disaster events costing more than a billion dollars each in the 
United States. Notably, the number of occurrences is rising and maintaining a trajectory 
well above the historical average. These changes are particularly difficult to plan for, since 
the use of a historical average would grossly under-predict the needs for the following year. 
 
Event statistics are added according to the date on which they ended. Statistics valid as of October 6, 
2017. Note that the historical average greatly undershoots recent experience.101 
Figure 5. Billion-Dollar Natural Disaster Events Each Year, by Month, from 
2008 to Present102 
As extreme heat becomes more prevalent, urban and agricultural areas could also 
experience drastic swings between torrential rain and drought, creating alternating disasters 
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of flooded-out crops and not enough rain to bring crops to harvest.103 Dependency on rain 
and water sources will become tenuous, especially drinking water. All Americans, 
particularly the poor and elderly, will be more vulnerable to emerging diseases and extreme 
heat events.104 Migration around the world is predicted to become a growing problem due 
to these very same threats, including in the United States.105 These are the tangible 
outcomes that threaten national security.  
The following sections discuss real-world scenarios that scientists and national 
security professionals understand are tied to the climate change threat.  
B. FOOD SECURITY 
The United States is accustomed to year-round access to an abundance and variety 
of food and food sources. The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) stipulates 
climate change has a significant potential to restrict food availability.106 A 2015 USDA 
report illustrates food crops’ high sensitivity to concentrated emissions in the atmosphere. 
The study found a direct correlation between higher concentrations of pollutants and food 
production; degrees of heat and cold, precipitation location and intensity, and seasonal 
changes—which were found to be affected by emissions and pollutants—affect the length 
of the growing season.  
Furthermore, weather disruption can devastate food availability globally. 
Unchecked global emissions through this century are projected to drastically decrease the 
international food supply, among other natural resources. Due to forced systemic changes 
in the Earth’s climactic behavior, significant temperature and precipitation changes are 
expected. At a minimum, the average temperature in the United States is expected to 
increase in the next twenty years between 3 and 10 degrees Fahrenheit (between 1 and 7 
                                                 
103 M.E. Brown et al., Climate Change, Global Food Security and the U.S. Food System (Washington, 
DC: USDA, 2015), 19, http://doi.org/10.7930/J0862DC7.  
104 “Climate Effects on Health,” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), last updated July 
26, 2016, https://www.cdc.gov/climateandhealth/effects/default.htm#factsheets.  
105 CDC.  
106 Brown et al., Climate Change. 
32 
degrees Celsius).107 The temperature and precipitation changes will directly impact 
agricultural and livestock production and distribution that will trickle down to food 
availability and cost.108 With temperature changes predicted to occur more rapidly than in 
the previous century (see Figure 6), humans will need to develop adaptive intervention 
measures to fulfill domestic and global food demands. According to the USDA, 
establishment of a U.S. adaptation partnership will be needed in four critical sectors: global 
trade, food aid, developmental support, as well as technological capability and 
information.109 
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RCP 2.6 is the lowest emissions achievable; and RCP 8.5 is the current projected global emission. 
Figure 6. Projections of U.S. Surface Temperatures110 
Today, the United States exports more food than other country, but will soon be 
surpassed by others—notably, China. Currently, the United States is experiencing a 
reduction in harvestable agriculture largely because of decreased public investment in 
research and development. This comes at a time when technological advancement in crop 
sustainability is a growing concern.111 Additionally, food prices are highly sensitive to 
supply and demand; crop-to-harvest considerations, production, and delivery and are 
therefore critical to market stability. As climate pressures intensify, world food prices will 
be affected, as will geo-political stability.112 International food instability can put increasing 
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pressure on the United States to provide more food to other countries or accept increasing 
numbers of immigrants, which could aggravate political tensions and lead to conflict.113 
Greenhouse gas concentrations directly affect food insecurity, especially for fragile areas 
that are susceptible to degradation. By 2080, USDA modeling found as many as 235 
million people may be malnourished due to climate impacts.114  
The USDA predicts, furthermore, that security of food production and resourcing 
will become an increasingly important sector for the United States as climate changes 
continue to manifest. With a predicted decline in U.S. exports, imported food commodities 
and sources will become more important to the U.S. food system. Everything from crop 
yields through supply chain logistics will become more vital, especially in areas challenged 
by climate extremes and frequency of climate-induced stressors, such as sea-level rise, 
drought, intense heat, and record rainfall events. The direct impact on yields may be 
compounded by impacts on secondary support systems, such as harvesting, preparation and 
storage for market, movement, contamination, disease, and the quality and nutritional value 
of the food.115 These pressures will have a direct effect on global availability and local 
affordability of fresh and nutritious food.  
Equally important is the potential disruption to the physical delivery of goods to 
domestic and foreign markets due to infrastructure that has not been adequately adapted to 
climate change. Transportation corridors in the United States are of particular concern, not 
only for maintaining freshness, but also for timely export and import. For example, a 
hurricane in the Gulf region could place as many as 41 percent of railroads and 51 percent 
of cargo facilities at risk of inundation and disruption.116 A smaller storm is estimated to 
endanger a third of regional rail lines.117 Additionally, sea-level rise has the capacity to put 
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28 percent of highway miles at risk with just a three-foot increase.118 Insufficiently adapted 
seaports and significant portions of the U.S. highway system will face greater risks from 
storm surge without investment in resilient infrastructure.  
These underlying pressures increase potential losses for the U.S. food system, 
including financial losses. The early impacts of climate change are affecting the United 
States today; we need adaptive techniques to offset the growing risk to our food supply.119 
C. WATER SECURITY  
Like food security, water security is a persistent and growing problem in the United 
States and many nations worldwide.120 The reliable weather patterns we count on to 
recharge underground and surface freshwater sources throughout the year are becoming 
increasingly tenuous as climate variations disrupt predictability. Water security 
encompasses not only water for purification and drinking but also for agriculture irrigation, 
industrial uses, fishing and hatcheries, wetlands and biodiversity, oceans and marine 
biology, the precipitation cycle, sustainable forests, recreation, and numerous other uses in 
daily life. Indeed, water is the essence of life; mankind depends on reliable access to it to 
survive.  
Drought, changing weather patterns, extreme heat, and other forces challenge that 
dependability. For example, the southwest United States is partially, but significantly, 
dependent on annual accumulations of mountain snowpack for fresh water. Warming 
weather affects precipitation, which changes the snow to rain in the mid-elevations, 
reducing snowpack storage (see Figure 7).121 Populations in the southwestern United States 
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and other arid regions continue to grow, which increases their need for abundant and 
reliable fresh water.122 
 
Figure 7. Decline in North American Snow Cover123 
California’s recent five-year drought demonstrates that winter snowfall and rainy 
seasons are unreliable, especially as the weather patterns change.124 Competition for water 
sources is occurring across the United States and globally. Business interests increasingly 
compete with cities and towns for the same freshwater sources, which has created new 
challenges in the courts.125 In 2014, the GAO conducted a review of a 2003 trend report on 
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water supply sourcing and competition in the United States.126 The review found that 
population growth, extreme weather, and demand from the energy sector are primary 
drivers for water resourcing and use concerns. Starting in 1950, the United States 
Geological Survey has produced a quinquennial report on types of water usage in the 
United States; the most recent review was published in 2010.127 This report shows that 
withdrawals for thermoelectric power and agricultural use comprise the largest markers, 
followed by public water drawdowns that, when combined, claim approximately 90 percent 
of freshwater sources, as shown in Figures 8 and 9.128  
Water security is not a unilateral concern of supply and demand for human survival 
solely in the United States. Water is the essential element for all life on Earth, and the 
functioning of Earth as we know it. Of all water on the Earth, just 2.5 percent is fresh water 
and almost 70 percent is frozen in glaciers.129 The illustration in Figure 10 shows the 
balance of Earth’s water sources and uses of fresh water.130  
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Figure 8. Total Freshwater Withdrawals by Category from 1950 to 2010131 
 
Figure 9. Total Freshwater Withdrawals from 1950 to 2010 per Day132 
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Figure 10. Global Freshwater Distribution and Usage133 
By 2023, a report from the Director of National Intelligence predicts instability will 
prevail in countries around the world that are important to U.S. interests. Primarily due to 
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inadequate fresh water supplies, today’s shared resources will become increasingly 
leveraged and potentially weaponized as water becomes scarcer. In that time, agricultural 
impacts can have global consequences and place increased stress on other regions with 
compromised water dependencies.134 The report further claims that, over the next twenty 
years, world economic trade will experience water stress primarily due to drought and 
insufficient surface water to maintain adequate hydropower.  
At the opposite end of the drought and dwindling fresh water spectrum, other water 
threats are just as pervasive, damaging, and expensive. The National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) predicts most coastal communities in the United 
States will experience more than a month of flooding annually by mid-century.135 The 
National Climate Assessment predicts heavy rain will continue to increase in the United 
States, following patterns observed since 1958 (see Figure 11). Additionally, sea-level rise 
is a dangerous element directly attributed to a warming planet. Cities around the country 
are developed without regard to elevation changes; salt water intrusion into the water 
system, infiltration of seawater into drainage systems, and an inability to allow storm-water 
runoff to drain into the sea threatens communities. Because oceans are carbon dioxide 
sinks, the water continues to warm and glaciers and icebergs melt ever faster, expanding 
water bodies around the world.136 Coastal communities in particular face increasingly 
devastating storm surges; land-falling hurricanes exacerbated by these conditions will have 
impacts on buildings and infrastructure. 
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Figure 11. Observed Change in Very Heavy Precipitation 1958 to 2012137 
D. HEALTH SECURITY 
While public health may seem to have an indirect threat from climate change, it is, 
in fact, a great concern: climate changes exacerbate the frailty of human health (see Figure 
12).138 The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s mission is to study, monitor, and 
correlate complexities of climate change impacts on human health.139 As heatwaves 
become hotter and more persistent, sensitive health groups may become overwhelmed by 
the heat, suffer heatstroke, or further complicate existing health issues.140 Climate change 
has also been implicated in the proliferation of vector-borne illnesses, which can be spread 
through insects that carry infectious diseases from animal to animal, animal to human, or 
human to human.141  
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Figure 12. Impact of Climate Change on Human Health142 
Additional concerns include the location and building design of healthcare 
facilities, which must be situated out of harm’s way.143 Hospitals and healthcare facilities 
cannot be easily evacuated in the event of a surprise flood or tornado. The United States 
has witnessed this firsthand, struggling with the complexity of evacuating convalescent 
homes for the elderly or other critical care recovery centers located in flood risk areas.144 
Healthcare facilities not in direct threat from natural disasters can easily be impacted by 
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secondary support interruptions, such as electricity, food, water, medicines, and supplies 
that have life-threatening implications when disrupted.145  
Pollution is also a threat to health security.146 Notably, a groundbreaking study on 
pollution and health by the Lancet Commission concludes that pollution is accountable for 
approximately 9 million deaths around the world each year (see Figure 13).147 The majority 
of are caused by pollutants in ambient air, followed by household air, and lastly by ground 
and water pollution. These are many of the same pollutants that blanket the Earth and 
systemically change the climate. 
 
Figure 13. Pollution-Related Deaths and Common Risk Factors, 2015148 
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E. DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY  
As climate changes put pressure on various sectors in the United States and 
globally, it is probable that domestic and international tensions will escalate.149 Migration 
from neighboring countries seeking security in the United States could become a more 
intense problem, as well as migration pressures—especially in areas facing political 
turmoil or conflict.150 As the world population increases, local and state governments will 
face increasing pressure to provide critical natural resources such as water and food, as 
discussed previously in this chapter.151 The National Intelligence Council and the 
Department of Defense have indicated their concern about international pressure to provide 
stability for at-risk nations.152 According to the Climate and Migration Coalition, based in 
the United Kingdom, changes in climate have signature impacts on migration, as illustrated 
in Figure 14.153 
In the United States, population growth and population aging both complicate 
migratory patterns. Urban centers and metropolitan areas are becoming increasingly 
popular for corporate growth, as they provide better job security and livelihoods for 
younger workers.154 Concurrently, a large aging population is gravitating toward southern 
states and concentrating near coastal, waterfront, and rural areas.155 People and services are 
becoming concentrated in areas that can experience emergency response and recovery 
complications, particularly if local and state emergency support is not keeping pace with 
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the growth. It also places an aging population in an area at increased risk for future 
migration and natural disasters, as discussed previously.156 
 
Figure 14. Climate Change–Induced Pathways Leading to Tensions and 
Potential Conflict157 
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In his book Storming the Wall, Todd Miller illustrates that we soon will no longer 
consider adaptation as an appropriate defense; it will become necessary to retreat from 
coastal cities.158 When approximately 30 percent of the global population is located in 
coastal areas, he projects that nearly 700 million will be in danger of the effects of sea-
level rise. Already, coastal cities in the United States have begun adaptation planning and 
implementation in earnest. Statistically, however, by the year 2030 nearly 55 million 
people will be exposed to floods and inundation, effectively doubling the existing 
exposure.159 The crisis is not localized to the United States; Miller claims that 21.5 million 
people were forced into migration annually by environmental pressure from “climate-
related hazards” between 2008 and 2015. As climate-induced pressure for survival 
increases, social, political, and ecological tensions will also become more prevalent. 
Miller’s research identifies that border walls are becoming popular, especially in wealthier 
nations. The Berlin Wall was one of sixteen global border walls when it famously came 
down in 1988; today, however, there are more than seventy—and that number is 
increasing.160 A fear of climate change–driven future mass migration, Miller vividly 
illustrates, is an important underlying reason for walls along the U.S. border to be built 
now.161 
F. ECONOMIC SECURITY 
Vulnerability to weather extremes may discourage new and existing business 
interests, which may not seem like safe investments.162 Insurance companies are becoming 
increasingly risk averse as they attempt to find balance between providing financial safety 
nets to impacted policyholders, yet reserving the integrity of their investment.163 
Economically driven supply chains across the nation are of vital importance. Supply chains 
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keep the economy moving; disruptions can have severe impacts that affect local, national, 
and global market reverberation. Commodities are shipped by truck, air, and sea-going 
vessels, and companies everywhere depend on manufacturers from around the world, 
which leave them vulnerable to supply chain disruptions. For example, Puerto Rico’s 
medical supply and pharmaceutical industries provide significant health products to the 
U.S. mainland.164 Following Hurricane Maria in 2017, disruption to these industries had 
persistent and near-catastrophic secondary impacts for months: a dwindling national supply 
of intravenous fluid bags and other drugs during the influenza season wreaked havoc on 
the U.S. mainland.165  
Just as Miller warned that the future climate change–induced migration threat 
heightens our incentive to build border walls, Stephen Morris of Bloomberg’s The Quint 
speculates similar concerns about U.S. withdrawal from international partnerships.166 
Morris points to the unrelenting state-sponsored surge in cyberattacks on all forms of 
important infrastructure in the United States. He warns that hackers—as reported by the 
World Economic Forum—are attempting to “trigger a breakdown in the systems that keep 
societies functioning.” His point is that the protectionist withdrawal from world 
partnerships will have economic and democratic tradeoffs. Interestingly, the World 
Economic Forum identifies extreme weather and natural disasters as “the biggest global 
risks for 2018,” as illustrated in Figure 15.167 
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Figure 15. World Economic Forum Global Risks Report 2018168 
Economic concerns in the United States are also very much tied to the national debt. 
Unfortunately, disasters such as extreme weather events are not annually budgeted. 
However, any natural disaster that impacts the United States, its territories, or protectorates 
and that meets federal economic thresholds for damages is eligible for significant federal 
assistance.169 Since the United States does not have a disaster savings account and disasters 
are not budgeted, the money to pay for disaster assistance must be borrowed, which 
increases the national debt. The United States is now experiencing billion-dollar weather 
disasters more frequently than ever; in 2017 alone, sixteen weather events in the United 
States accrued billions of dollars, each, in damages (see Figure 16).170 The previous year, 
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2016, set the second highest record, at fifteen billion-dollar U.S. natural disasters.171 Each 
new disaster added at least a billion dollars to the national debt; for 2016–17, that means 
at least 29 billion dollars in increased debt in just two years. Furthermore, the United States 
does not fully recover from previous disasters before it experiences the next ones. As 
climate impacts intensify, the economic impacts will, too. As a debtor nation, our trend of 
funding disaster response and recovery will be difficult to sustain.  
 
Figure 16. NOAA 2017 Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters172 
Furthermore, disasters are increasingly associated with flooding, which raises 
additional concerns for the national debt.173 The National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP) 
is a federally underwritten insurance program (managed by FEMA, which is a component 
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of DHS) for private and public property owners in the United States. The NFIP is a federal 
program largely because of massive and unregulated flood risk across the United States. 
Of particular concern to the U.S. federal debt is the NFIP’s persistent insolvency because 
of the frequency and severity that flood events are occurring.  Following Hurricanes 
Katrina in 2005 and Sandy in 2012, the NFIP suffered one economic setback after 
another.174 Congress forgave much of the debt incurred by these events, but the program 
has since been wracked by expensive floods; it is once more in debt to the U.S. Treasury 
by more than $20 billion.175 Because the premiums paid by policyholders do not cover the 
full risk in high-risk areas, and certain areas repeatedly soak up the majority of the losses, 
the debt continues to increase.176 A similar problem with wind risk in the state of Florida 
following Hurricane Andrew (in 1992) is another example that shows why state-managed 
insurance policies exist for hurricane- or wind-related events in high-risk coastal regions. 
Repetitive losses over time continue to be a financial burden to the Treasury, which is a 
born by the American taxpayer. Yet cities and towns continue to allow their structures to 
remain, and continue to build new structures in high-risk areas, creating a complex cycle 
of disaster.  
Unfortunately, the private, for-profit insurance sector does not engage with flood 
risk. When the risk is greater than the reward, or profit, insurance companies are generally 
not altruistically compelled to insure investments in high-risk areas. Flood damage to the 
built environment is the most frequent impact of weather events.177 Insurance companies 
know this. The federal government currently has cheaper insurance premiums than the 
private sector because taxpayers subsidize policyholders’ premiums.178 This is 
compounded by climate change as the potential risk increases.  
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Disaster preparedness at the community level is variably funded in advance and 
likely dependent on yet more federal grants. When disasters strike, state or federal 
assistance is not guaranteed to be immediate. Federal assistance is predicated on formulas 
for damage thresholds, determined by Congress.179 Poor and low-income communities may 
have significant damage and little way of paying for repairs, but may not meet the damage 
threshold to receive federal assistance.180 This can leave entire communities broken and 
bankrupt, which creates systemic losses in property values and for viable businesses. Not 
every community—nor every individual—has the financial strength to rely on self-
governance and the ability of its people to recover.  
Since much global trade is conducted in U.S. currency, it is important for the federal 
government to maintain the strength of the U.S. dollar. If the United States is not able to 
recover from catastrophic natural disasters, it signals weakness to our economy and our 
adversaries. The European and Asian stock markets depend on the strength of the U.S. 
financial system; if it is perceived that the United States is incapable of handling its 
financial obligations and must continue to conduct expensive recovery operations, the 
cascading effect would likely be a global recession.181 Today, Wall Street is concerned 
about potential recession over the next several years because of the U.S. debt and 
inflationary pressures.182 Consider, for example, the U.S. stock markets and the 
international market reaction following the attacks of September 11, 2001. The economy 
in the U.S. sharply shrank well into 2002, and limped toward a near-catastrophic recession 
in 2008 triggered by faulty lending practices.183 Cumulative disasters that cost the nation 
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billions of dollars year after year—debt that cannot be paid from cash reserves—will create 
cascading negative consequences.   
G. TERRORISM 
The chaos and disruption of a natural disaster act as force multipliers for our 
adversaries’ sinister actions. As established in the previous sections, vulnerability to natural 
hazards can show a nation’s momentary or systemic weakness.184 The speed and 
effectiveness of government response and recovery actions tell a story that adversaries can 
exploit. When major disasters strike the United States and our focus is on immediate 
response needs, our adversaries may find moments of opportunity. As climate change 
worsens and disasters strike more often, opportunities for deliberate acts of terrorism will 
increase.185 As of now, the United States has been fortunate; however, these opportunities 
can greatly exacerbate an existing natural disaster. 
FEMA is the federal government entity responsible for disaster coordination with 
state, local, tribal, and territorial governments to prevent, respond to, mitigate, protect, and 
recover from natural, technological, and man-made disasters.186 During high-demand 
events, the FEMA workforce becomes stressed to fulfill personnel deployment 
requirements. A single large event can easily occupy significant staff demands for a year 
or more; with more concurrent events across the nation, staffing resources are spread thin, 
with scant ability for rotational relief. DHS, FEMA’s parent department, has a voluntary 
Surge Capacity Force that encourages individuals within all twenty-two components of 
DHS to willingly work disaster events in order to augment a strained or depleted federal 
disaster workforce; this shows how overstressed resources become when disasters strike in 
close timelines.187 As the frequency and intensity of climate events grow, so does the strain 
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on resources. Additionally, not all disasters are caused by weather. Earthquakes, tsunamis, 
and man-made accidents all have the potential for significant damages and major 
declarations.  
Timed right, another large-scale event could tip the economy enough to once again 
crash stock and commodities markets.188 Since the declaration of the War on Terror, the 
U.S. debt limit has spiraled ever higher to support military and other activities.189 Currently, 
the United States has reached 103 percent debt-to-gross domestic product, far in excess of 
the 77 percent acceptable to the World Bank.190 Considering this economic strain, an overt 
attack by any enemy during a time of weakness could be catastrophic to the United States. 
Will world leaders continue to lend trillions of dollars to support a nation that cannot 
support itself?  
Confidence in government is essential for national morale and belief in the 
capitalist-democratic system. A disaster-weakened national security posture creates an 
ideal situation for an adversary to incite domestic instability. Russian interference in the 
2016 U.S. presidential election should be cause for great alarm; it shows that schemes do 
not have to be initiated by stateless terrorists, but can come from competitors who are 
looking for an economic or strategic advantage. Economic stress from disasters and 
bungled response in the public eye could have an enormous impact on the American 
people’s already fragile confidence in the U.S. government.  
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IV. PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATIONS AND THE NATIONAL 
NARRATIVE 
True statecraft is manifest when, in difficult times, we uphold high 
principles and think of the long-term common good. 
—Pope Francis, Laudato Si, May 24, 2015191 
 
The subject of climate change in the United States is politically volatile—to the 
detriment of its citizens.192 The topic’s political controversy has affected citizens’ 
understanding of the basic issue, not to mention its drivers and the complex details.193 The 
In 2016 the Pew Research Center found that 70 percent of Democrats believe climate 
scientists’ research and its accuracy, while only 15 percent of Republican voters have the 
same confidence.194 However, of the same pool of respondents, only 54 percent of 
Democrats believe these same scientists understand the cause of climate change, versus 11 
percent of conservative and 19 of percent moderate Republican voters.195 This growing 
disagreement over the past few decades has made climate action a political tool. Both 
Democrats and Republicans agree that climate scientists act in the public’s interest, but 57 
percent of conservatives think the scientists are seeking career advancement or are 
politically motivated.196 
Doing something about the climate problem is a different matter. The most common 
dispute skeptics raise is that climate change is not caused by human activity, but is the 
result of natural phenomena.197 Conservative politicians insist that the alleged human 
contribution to a warming planet is overstated, as are any growing weather impacts 
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stemming from it.198 While nearly 60 percent of liberal Democrats believe negative 
environmental effects, such as weather extremes and sea-level rise, will result from climate 
change, only 20 percent of conservative Republicans hold the same opinions.199 Indeed, 
with a majority of conservative Republican voters sensing no real danger, only 29 percent 
of the same group of voters believes that fossil fuel power plant emissions should be 
regulated, while nearly three-quarters of liberal Democrats think emission controls are 
necessary.200  
Business interests and important economic sectors have considerable influence in 
shaping climate-related public policy.201 As representatives of the people, politicians are 
obligated to represent all home district constituencies, including businesses. Businesses 
that contribute to the climate problem seek political support to be free from regulatory 
emission controls, which they believe are too burdensome and will make their businesses 
less competitive.202 Others, however, claim that society contributes to global warming and 
its growing effects/ manufacturing emissions, fossil fuel use for energy production and 
transportation, and even some food management practices—such as massive feedlots and 
deforestation—are examples of mankind’s contribution to the escalating problem.203 
Proponents of regulation assert that we must urgently limit and reduce CO2 and other 
emissions that are leading to dangerous atmospheric changes.204 Some contend that 
corporations must be held morally responsible for the security of all life on this planet, 
which they gamble for capitalistic profit.205 Most climate scientists predict a dangerous 
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future; we must urgently make societal adaptations, they argue, to offset the unavoidable 
negative impacts.206 As natural disasters across the United States become more frequent 
and intense, comprehensive federal climate change legislation remains elusive.207 Public 
dialogue is a necessary part of adaptation.  
Climate is a persistent and increasingly important national security concern that 
requires careful navigation and competent leadership at the helm of the nation.208 Despite 
this importance, climate change has not had systemic national doctrine capable of eclipsing 
personal philosophy. It is an often contradictory issue from presidential administration to 
administration. This inconsistency in itself is problematic if we seek to attain, and maintain, 
a whole-of-nation approach to national security. U.S. presidents broadly campaign on 
issues that, once elected, become a narrative for future doctrine. This is an important entry 
point; public engagement is needed to expand the dialogue on important national issues. 
Political capital coming out of an election is capable of transitioning campaign issues into 
action toward the candidate (or president’s) philosophical governance. Climate change is 
a transcendent problem that has slowly emerged over nearly the past half-century in 
presidential narratives for national leadership, albeit with varying messaging.   
Climate change has been an issue of presidential administrations since the time of 
Jimmy Carter.209 In October 1978, Carter signed the National Climate Program Act, 
signaling the criticality to develop and understand climate science.210 The subsequent 
Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush administrations supported climate action and 
policy.211 However, during the H. W. Bush era, opposition began to grow regarding 
                                                 
206 “Scientific Consensus: Earth’s Climate Is Warming,” NASA, accessed December 3, 2016, 
http://climate.nasa.gov/scientific-consensus/.   
207 Carlarne, Climate Change Law and Policy, 33. 
208 CNA Military Advisory Board, Risks of Climate Change, 29. 
209 Jimmy Carter, “Memorandum from the President on the National Climate Program,” The 
American Presidency Project, October 31, 1978, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=30082. 
210 Carter.  
211 Robert A. Wampler, “U.S. Climate Change Policy in the 1980s,” National Security Archive, 
George Washington University, December 2, 2015, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB536-
Reagan-Bush-Recognized-Need-for-US-Leadership-on-Climate-Change-in-1980s/.  
58 
mankind’s contribution to greenhouse gas pollution.212 In 1989, a private-sector group of 
primarily oil companies and automakers formed the Global Climate Coalition to counter 
the notion that greenhouse gases were contributing to climate change, as espoused by 
Goddard Space Institute Director Hansen.213 However, shortly before his departure from 
the White House, Bush signed the United States onto the UNFCCC, and Congress ratified 
the decision.214 Meanwhile, the legislative branch of the Republican Party began echoing 
special interest opposition to regulatory climate policy.215  
A. THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION (1993–2001) 
Succeeding George H. W. Bush’s presidency, in 1993 the Clinton administration 
sought to leverage the winds of political change to reenergize climate policy. In Clinton’s 
first year in office, he and Vice President Gore released the “Climate Change Action 
Plan.”216 The plan focused on economic energy policy and mitigating emissions, but did 
not discuss national security or climate adaptation. Lacking any regulatory teeth, it was an 
appeal for voluntary action, with targets and milestones, to reverse emissions.217 The 
Department of Energy cajoled the energy markets to comply voluntarily, lest more 
restrictive regulatory measures emerge as a result, and it gained some participation.218   
Internationally, the Clinton administration was determined to shape global climate 
change objectives and reinforce cooperative solutions. In the 1995 Berlin Agreement, the 
first global agreement under UNFCCC, Vice President Gore accepted more stringent 
policies for developed nations. Essentially, the more mature industrialized countries, 
including the United States, would carry a larger share of emissions reductions and pricier 
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regulations. He executed this commitment without the agreement of Congress.219 During 
this time, Congress was shifting environmental policy toward cost-benefit impacts or 
market incentives.220 Congress took Gore’s action as the executive branch’s dismissal of 
their economic concerns. Despite the Clinton administration’s subsequent efforts to 
introduce several economic schemes, such as cap and trade and expanding carbon sinks, 
the rift with Congress became too wide.221  
Climate divisiveness with Congress beset the second half of the Clinton 
administration. Vice President Gore continued to advance what the administration believed 
was an achievable U.S. agenda, including dialogue with the public. They pursued 
development of the UNFCCC Kyoto Protocol, through which emissions reductions would 
be reversed to 1990 levels by the year 2000.222 But Congress had dug in and, as a show of 
force, the Senate passed a declaration that it would not ratify the Kyoto Protocol—with 
zero dissenters.223 Congress contended the Kyoto Protocol would trigger energy prices to 
escalate in the United States while economically favoring China and India.224 Although 
Clinton signed onto the Kyoto Protocol in 1998, the treaty was never received or ratified 
by Congress.225  
Despite framing the national narrative on climate change, Clinton’s actions were 
ridiculed by environmentalists as too weak and by industry as too restrictive.226 Thus, the 
U.S. government’s narrative was not unified. The subject of climate change had become 
muddied, tense, and confusing in the public domain and lost an opportunity for a solid 
national doctrine. In the remaining years of the Clinton White House, executive orders on 
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environmental rules had become Clinton’s only path of change until his departure in 
January 2001.227  
B. THE GEORGE W. BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2001–2009) 
Signaling an unmistakable divergence in presidential narrative from the previous 
administration, George W. Bush did not address climate change for a full year following 
his inauguration.228 In February 2002, the Bush administration released the U.S. Global 
Climate Change Initiative and the Global Climate Change Policy Book.229 The policy 
received few accolades from climate advocates and was considered neutral in advancing 
the climate change mitigation discussion.230 Calling for more study, Bush theorized that 
prosperity would self-correct the atmosphere, and called for emitters to voluntarily reduce 
the quotient of CO2 to economic productivity.231  
By 2005, the Bush administration had assembled the Asia-Pacific Partnership on 
Clean Development and Climate with six countries to discuss pollution, energy, and 
climate concerns.232 In 2007 and 2008, the Major Economies Meeting on Energy Security 
and Climate Change was also convened at the behest of the Bush administration, eyeing 
engagement with the United Nations in a move to counterbalance the climate-centric global 
discussion, to include economic interests and energy sectors.233 The U.S. position was to 
reframe greenhouse gas reduction as a target, not binding metrics. 
In 2007, the Senate debated America’s Climate Security Act of 2007 (S.B. 2191), 
proposing a cap-and-trade program on fossil fuel emissions in the United States, but was 
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unable to reach consensus on a policy that would not undermine the economy.234 Recall 
that the administration’s climate policy was released only six months after the 9/11 attacks, 
when economic conditions were strained.235 In an analysis by the Heritage Foundation, the 
bill was strongly denounced for promising “extraordinary perils” for the economy.236 
Congress failed to codify any kind of legislative measures on climate change or global 
warming. In November 2008, the Congressional Research Service (CRS) prepared a report 
for Congress titled Global Climate Change: Three Policy Perspectives.237 The report 
provides a snapshot in time on the status of U.S. climate leadership. It reiterates Bush’s 
2002 concern that higher climate science consensus was necessary to confirm that climate 
change is real, and promoted voluntary emission reduction by U.S. economic interests. The 
report concluded that any forward movement on climate policy would be determined by 
future policymakers and be dependent upon new science confirming the presence of man-
made influence weighted by economic, technological, and ecological considerations.238 In 
other words, the debate needed fresh eyes. Bush remained steadfast in his encouragement 
of global cooperation while avoiding binding agreements that could restrict the economy 
or American workers.239 Congressional support to enact any law became mired in partisan 
divide.240  
Bush eventually acknowledged the importance of climate change and postulated 
that global emitters should set emissions reduction goals and come up with a new plan. But 
the Bush administration never enforced binding agreements on itself.241    
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C. THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION (2009–2017) 
Starting in 2010, the Obama administration included climate change as an 
unquestionable national security threat. In June 2013, Obama introduced domestic plans to 
acculturate federal agencies, indeed the nation, to shape the national dialogue on climate 
change.242 A comprehensive climate policy, The President’s Climate Action Plan, detailed 
numerous far-reaching avenues. The administration pursued state-of-the-art climate 
research and launched the Climate Data Initiative.243 Developing new public-facing, open-
access websites, it advanced national preparedness using scientific data that was easily 
accessible and understandable.244  
Congress, however, did not cooperate with the White House.245 As Clinton’s did 
during his second term, the Obama White House used executive orders to push climate 
policy in lieu of cooperative rulemaking. Only a few months following the release of the 
Climate Action Plan, Obama issued Preparing the United States for the Impacts of Climate 
Change (Executive Order 13653), which instructs federal agencies to develop climate 
adaptation plans using existing pathways, integrating state and local governments and the 
private sector.246 Federal agencies reviewed their regulatory statutes to determine how 
climate adaptation could be leveraged under the scope of their existing programmatic 
authorities not only internally, but particularly with states, territories, tribes, and local 
governments. In response, departments and agencies developed climate change 
vulnerability assessments and impact adaptation plans.247  
In 2015, the CRS reviewed these climate adaptation plans, summarized the 
opportunities, and submitted a full-scale review and suggestions for Congressional 
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consideration.248 To sum, the CRS extended an invitation for Congress to engage in the 
climate adaptation initiative. CRS asked Congress to leverage its resources to oversee 
progress and provide legal guidance to federal agencies, opening the door for congressional 
guidance, organization, funding, strategies, and performance measures. Specifically, CRS 
recommended Congress review risks to the federal government, determine cost-benefit 
considerations and the feasibility of corrective actions, and determine if modifications to 
agencies’ statutory and budgetary authorities were necessary.249 In August 2015, the 
Obama administration released the Clean Power Plan, the first document of its kind for 
reducing carbon emissions. Under the plan, carbon emissions would be reduced by 32 
percent by the year 2030 through a combination of coal-powered energy reduction and 
increases in clean energy sources.250  
On September 3, 2016, Obama officially signed into the Paris Agreement. This 
global climate initiative is the successor to the 1997 Kyoto Accord, resolving some key 
differences that prevented its ratification. It was a signature achievement of the Obama 
White House, committing the United States to combat climate change.251 
The Obama administration was a strong leader in the development and pursuit of a 
new and refreshed national—and global—push toward emissions reduction and renewable 
energy sources.252 Reports were developed and issued from top administration officials, 
such as the Director of National Intelligence, the Department of Defense, and DHS that 
showed climate change as a serious national security threat to the United States. Climate 
activists, however, condemned the second-term initiatives as coming too late to solidify 
legislative change. And the national dialogue would change once again upon Obama’s exit 
from the White House.   
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D. THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION (2017–PRESENT) 
Donald J. Trump, newly inaugurated in January 2017, had only superficially 
signaled how his administration would approach climate change. During the campaign, 
Trump was skeptical that the climate was changing at all, though he did express concern 
about the impact climate change has on business interests and American competitiveness 
in global markets.253 In 2012, years before his inauguration would take place, Trump 
claimed through social media, tweeting that “the concept of global warming was created 
by and for the Chinese in order to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive.”254 This 
mindset has defined the Trump narrative on climate change, which was reflected more 
recently in his December 28, 2017, tweet: “In the East, it could be the COLDEST New 
Year’s Eve on record. Perhaps we could use a little bit of that good old Global Warming 
that our Country, but not other countries, was going to pay TRILLIONS OF DOLLARS to 
protect against. Bundle up!”255 According to one researcher, Trump has tweeted about his 
climate skepticism in more than one hundred messages.256 David S. Ferriero, archivist of 
the United States at the U.S. National Archives, confirmed that all tweets since the 
president’s inauguration are considered official presidential records, according to the 
Presidential Records Act of 1978.257 Additionally, in separate court cases, two judges ruled 
                                                 
253 Juliet Eilperin, “Trump Says ‘Nobody Really Knows’ if Climate Change Is Real,” Washington 
Post, December 11, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2016/ 
12/11/trump-says-nobody-really-knows-if-climate-change-is-real/?utm_term=.5bd1295a956b. 
254 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), “The concept of global warming was created by and for 
the Chinese in order to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive,” Twitter, November 6, 2012, 11:15 
a.m., https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/265895292191248385.  
255 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), “In the East, it could be the COLDEST New Year’s Eve 
on record. Perhaps we could use a little bit of that good old Global Warming that our Country, but not other 
countries, was going to pay TRILLIONS OF DOLLARS to protect against. Bundle up!,” Twitter, 
December 28, 2017, 4:01 p.m., https://twitter.com/realdonaldtrump/status/946531657229701120?lang=en. 
256 Dylan Matthews, “Donald Trump Has Tweeted Climate Change Skepticism 115 Times,” Vox, 
June 1, 2017, https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/6/1/15726472/trump-tweets-global-warming-
paris-climate-agreement.  
257 Ali Rogin and Veronica Stracqualursi, “National Archives Advises White House to Preserve All 
Trump Tweets, Including Deleted Ones,” ABC News, April 4, 2017, https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/ 
national-archives-advises-white-house-preserve-trump-tweets/story?id=46570319.  
65 
presidential tweets are official statements of records.258 Outside of Twitter, the Trump 
administration has made no official statement on climate change doctrine. However, the 
administration’s actions indicate intent to weaken, and more broadly eliminate, climate 
initiatives.259  
In March 2017, Trump signed Executive Order 13783, which rescinded the Clean 
Power Plan, the President’s Climate Action Plan, Preparing the United States for the 
Impacts of Climate Change, and the presidential memorandum on “Climate Change and 
National Security” issued in 2016, as well as other leadership actions on climate mitigation 
and adaptation.260 After Trump signed the new executive order, an unnamed White House 
official cited India and China as examples of economic prosperity working to protect the 
environment.261 The comment is reminiscent of the George W. Bush dogma that a thriving 
economy would naturally guard against climate change.262 The veracity of these claims, 
however, could not be verified.  
By August 2017, the Climate Science Advisory Committee, which provides the 
National Climate Assessment Report, was officially disbanded within the National 
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration.263 Incidentally, two weeks before 
Hurricane Harvey ravaged the Gulf Coast of Texas, Trump signed an executive order 
revoking stronger standards on federal infrastructure and rescinding the Federal Flood Risk 
Management Standard that required future flood risk to be considered when any federal 
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funds were utilized in infrastructure or other development.264 In November 2017, Trump 
abandoned the United States’ commitment to the Paris Agreement.265 Today, the United 
States singularly refuses to join the Paris Agreement—an agreement that Trump believes 
it is damaging to American economic interests.266 In December 2017, the Trump 
administration’s first National Security Strategy was released, and it notably departs from 
the previous administration’s discussion on climate change.267 Climate change is not 
mentioned as a national security threat.  
As of May 2018, Trump has not filled the science advisor vacancy in his 
administration.268 Without strong leadership in the White House, science is believed to be 
unrepresented in the executive branch’s decision-making process, amid additional 
concerns that federal scientific program funding has been cut or eliminated, including 
funding for NASA’s Carbon Monitoring System.269 The White House contends it has 
increased the 2018 budget by 2 percent over the previous year, and argues that it is reducing 
duplicative programs.270  
Climate change information has been removed from federal websites, and civil 
service scientists have been replaced by political appointees in key science decision–
making areas.271 The Trump administration’s image has suffered in the science community, 
having issued ninety-six executive orders and legislative or policy changes to reverse or 
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modify climate or environmental sustainability policy in eighteen months; eighty-six of 
them in 2017 alone.272 In the absence of a formal doctrine on climate change, these actions 
indicate a national dialogue that formal policy has not.   
E. SUMMARY 
The topic of climate change has become so divisive in the United that it is difficult 
to have rational debates leading to decisions and, thus, actions. Creating a resilient future 
first begins with a state of unity that is not possible to construct quickly. This chapter 
captures only the most critically defining climate-related policies of U.S. presidential 
administrations over the last several decades, including swings in U.S. leadership over 
time. To understand the climate threat, it is foundational to also understand how scientists 
and policymakers perceive its risk to society over time. In conducting this research, it 
became apparent that the political leadership in the United States has various beliefs about 
the topic itself that directly affect national philosophy and a steady path forward.   
Inconsistency in climate doctrine from administration to administration destabilizes 
the public’s ability to understand the breadth or depth of the threat. Furthermore, the 
reversal of policies based on presidential narratives every eight years does not allow 
meaningful policy progress against a growing national security threat, particularly as 
illustrated by the Obama–Trump administration differences reviewed in this chapter. To 
reverse the intensifying impacts of climate change, we must make changes to human 
behavior that will take much longer to achieve than the speed at which climate impacts are 
occurring.273 The exploration of presidential narratives calls into question the urgency of 
sustained leadership on a critical issue.  
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V. LAWS, REGULATIONS, AND POLICIES 
A people that values its privileges above its principles soon loses both. 
—Dwight D. Eisenhower274 
 
As natural disasters grow in frequency and severity, disaster losses are becoming 
increasingly unsustainable.275 Federal policymakers are concerned about the mounting 
costs and the growing federal deficits, and their decisions play an important role in 
providing intelligent and consistent guidance to federal, state, and local officials.276 Three 
key areas policy areas are central to this discussion: emergency management regulations 
and policy, land use, building codes. To become a disaster-resilient nation, we must explore 
current resilience policies and preventative measures—including those for sustainable 
growth and development. Particularly, it is important to review policies that control how 
land is being used, how it is developed, who makes those decisions, the guidelines for them, 
and safe thresholds for the U.S. economy.277 Building codes are equally important as they 
determine our buildings’ structural integrity to withstand weather extremes.278 Disasters 
will continue to happen; when they do, these regulations and policies guide federal disaster 
assistance. But do the policies consider the threat of increased climate-related impacts?  
A. EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT  
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act guides 
federal emergency management assistance to states, territories, tribes, and communities 
after disasters.279 Federal assistance is provided through specific programs, as allowed for 
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by law. Although the programs are codified, their processes can be subjective to 
interpretation and application at the regional level, as long as the programmatic outcome is 
objective. While straightforward, the federally underwritten National Flood Insurance 
Program (NFIP) routinely faces three controversies. First: the program enables more flood 
disasters to happen by allowing structures to be built in floodplains and other known flood-
risk areas.280 Second, policyholders in some of the country’s highest flood-risk areas 
receive government subsidies through reduced premiums.281 Third, as previously 
mentioned, the NFIP owes $23 billion to the U.S. Treasury due to Hurricanes Katrina and 
Sandy.282 With this in mind, it is incredible that, according to the GAO, floods comprise 99 
of U.S. disasters, and only 14 percent of homeowners hold flood insurance policies.283  
The public has misperception that, when disaster strikes, FEMA can rescue victims 
immediately and help them return their livelihoods to pre-disaster status. In reality, FEMA 
can provide only limited basic services and assistance to help disaster victims; this level of 
assistance cannot restore normality for all those affected. Federal disaster assistance is 
divided into several categories—primarily: individual assistance, public assistance, and 
mitigation.284 These programs help restore most public infrastructure, help people with 
temporary housing, and provide small cash payments to help survivors to restart their 
lives.285 A minimum of 75 percent of public assistance grants help municipalities restore 
public infrastructure damaged in the disaster, such as water treatment and wastewater 
facilities; fire and police stations; city-, county-, or state-owned buildings; roads and 
bridges; and other infrastructure.286  
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Misuse of federal funds is always a concern.287 The Individual Assistance Program 
has also not escaped scrutiny for waste, fraud, and abuse. Because FEMA manages large 
sums of money under critical stress and suboptimal conditions, the Office of the Inspector 
General audits its programs. In a 2015 inspection, the Inspector General audited fifty-five 
grants and eight programs; they found a “29 percent questioned-cost rate,” which means 
that one-third of the grants issued by these programs were potentially wasted expenditures 
in the Disaster Relief Fund.288 Averaging $10 billion annually, a 29-percent questioned 
cost-rate equates to approximately $3 billion in improper disaster-related expenditures, 
which could include, “duplicate payments, unsupported costs, improper contract costs, and 
unauthorized expenditures.”289  
FEMA has proposed a disaster deductible option that would incentivize states to 
invest in their own resilience measures and reduce the federal burden on disaster 
reconstruction.290 Essentially, states that use this option would earn credits against a 
deductible, similar to insurance. Currently, the Stafford Act and its amendments provide 
significant taxpayer assistance to restore roads, bridges, and other public infrastructure that 
are damaged or destroyed due to disasters.291 These expenditures suggest that there are 
higher taxpayer subsidies for disaster recovery than through private insurance or other 
resources.292 Incentives may help provide insurance for these structures since the Stafford 
Act pays the majority of the costs to replace them.  
Could disasters be prevented by increased accountability or other incentives? This 
is an important question to ask, considering the risks of climate change. With proper 
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maintenance, structures are designed with an average useful lifespan of thirty to fifty years. 
As natural hazards intensify, the Stafford Act does not consider increased threats for post-
disaster repairs or replaced infrastructure.293 The Disaster Relief Fund will pay to replace 
the damaged or destroyed infrastructure to pre-disaster condition (using current codes); 
however, functional authority rests with FEMA to apply additional funds under section 406 
of the Stafford Act to refine the original infrastructure to withstand increased impacts.294 
At the time of this writing, statistics were unavailable for rating the percentage of FEMA 
public assistance projects that receive 406 mitigation.  
B. LAND USE  
Land use planning and zoning are largely locally controlled practices.295 
Historically, most land owners have had freedom to build at will—until the 1960s, when 
some land use controls started to emerge.296 Today, land use controls are in place in most 
local jurisdictions across the United States, though they are spotty, inconsistent, and largely 
unregulated.297 Several constitutional provisions and federal regulations or policies interact 
with local land use or allow federal agencies to have some specific jurisdictional 
authority.298 While the Constitution provides states with the primary authority to govern, 
restrict, guide or direct land use policy at the local level, state governments delegate that 
authority to the municipal level, within state law.299 Although local jurisdictions develop 
and utilize land use plans and comprehensive plans supporting growth and development, 
there are no laws governing the intersection of land use and natural hazard areas beyond 
environmental damage. Federal programs can incentivize local jurisdictions to comply 
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with new or changing restrictions, but local control reigns. For example, only twelve states 
have voluntarily adopted the International Zoning Code.300 Unfortunately, this means local 
governments often stop short of long-range growth and development planning, as it relates 
to hazard areas intrinsic to the region.301  
As urban areas grow, land becomes more expensive, and new development 
encroaches further and further into more risk-averse areas. Bigger populations require more 
local investment in emergency management, but this can be controlled when using smart 
growth mitigation practices.302 For example, siting future land use below a large high-
hazard dam is an undertaking worthy of extra vigilance by municipal land use planners and 
local elected leaders. As acknowledged by its designation as a “high-hazard” dam—which 
means loss of life is possible if the dam fails—the dam represents a specific risk.303 Of the 
more than 90,000 dams in the United States with a median age of fifty-six years, more than 
15,000 are classified high-hazard.304 Figure 17 shows the locations of high-hazard dams 
across the country. These data reveal that at least 15,000 communities are located beneath 
a high-hazard dam. As municipalities determine appropriate land use for their community’s 
growth and development (e.g., high-density single and multi-family residential 
neighborhoods, landfills, commercial and industrial uses, hazardous waste, etc.) the 
location of the high-hazard dam should be extremely important simply due to the amount 
of water stored behind the dam.305 Most are earthen, and all are human-engineered. While 
dam breaches are considered low-probability, high-consequence events, a high-hazard 
classification means that, even if it is not likely to break, if it does people will die.  
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High-hazard dams are illustrated in red, significant-hazard dams are yellow, and low-
hazard dams are black. 
Figure 17. Dams in the United States by Hazard Classification306 
The 2016 Oroville Dam spillway is a perfect example.307 Following years of 
exceptional drought, California was inundated with rains and upstream snowmelt–as much 
as 150 percent more than usual. Expansion and contraction of the earthen dam and concrete 
spillways corrupted the integrity of the concrete, allowing the water to exploit minor cracks 
into critical structural failure of the primary and auxiliary spillways.308 Soon, more than 
187,000 residents below the dam were in danger and had to be evacuated.309 Luckily, 
following quick actions by dam operators and a miraculous reduction of rain, stress was 
reduced on the system, the dam did not fail, and no lives were lost.  
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High-hazard dams are required to have Emergency Action Plans and Inundation 
Zones that identify downstream risk should a dam failure occur, and outline preparedness 
and emergency actions.310 Not all do, however. Furthermore, an inundation map that 
identifies potential velocity, scope, or depth of rising water is recommended, but not 
required. In the absence of an inundation map, dam safety officials may be uncertain how 
to quantify impacts to inform preparedness planning and actions. Consider, also, that many 
dams are old and the personnel, materials, and equipment needed to maintain them are 
persistently difficult to procure.311 The American Society of Civil Engineers estimated that 
$3.3 trillion in federal funds are necessary to replace aging infrastructure over the next ten 
years—something the dam hazard classifications do not take into consideration.312 
There is no readily available literature about the regulatory connection between 
municipal growth and development below these dams. Rhetorically, however, it is 
reasonable to consider: Do residents realize locations of nearby dams or potential dam 
threats when choosing a place to live, or when thinking about local shopping or 
entertainment, such as cinemas and restaurants? If so, do they know whom to ask? Only 
those few individuals aware of the voluntary FEMA-approved Hazard Mitigation Plan 
would be wise enough to ask if their community has one and when it was last updated. 
Hazard Mitigation Plans are comprehensive documents that communities develop, and that 
receive FEMA and state approval when they meet specific guidelines.313 The plan includes 
information about how the community plans land use in hazard areas. From a regulatory 
perspective, accountability is likely dependent upon post-disaster impacts and investigative 
forensics. 
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C. BUILDING CODES 
The public expects that homes and businesses are built according to local building 
codes, are appropriately permitted, and undergo occupancy safety certifications. Structures 
should be safe to live and work in without unreasonable fear of catastrophe. This is the 
basic tenet of the government contract with its citizens: in exchange for paying taxes and 
abiding by the law, the government will provide safety.314 Disasters prove, however, that 
this is not enough.315 Land use policy and building codes in the United States are 
controversial, and may be insufficient against the strengthening forces of Earth’s natural 
weather systems.316  
Why have historical climate threats repeatedly destroyed communities in the United 
States? One or more of the following is happening: the buildings are under far too much 
stress against strengthening weather impacts, buildings codes and reliability standards are 
under-rated or inadequate, or population/economic growth pressures communities to make 
hazardous areas available for development. Building codes in the United States are 
designed based on past events, known as model codes.317 Model codes are not state or 
locality specific. As climate change intensifies weather impacts, the existing building stock 
and codes are insufficient to withstand increased damage.318  
For many, the “American Dream” means having freedom to chase wealth, 
education, a career, family life, and home ownership. When it comes to home ownership, 
in 2016, 6 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product originated through real estate 
construction.319 The record is 8.9 percent in 2006, just before the mortgage sector meltdown 
of 2008.320 Nearly 2 million jobs are created by the housing market, which makes it big 
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business for the national economy.321 Remarkably, according to the International Code 
Council, all U.S. states adopted the International Building Code and the International 
Residential Code, with the exception of Wisconsin.322 Yet housing appears to be a 
disposable commodity.323 This multi-trillion-dollar asset in the U.S. economy has a dark 
side, full of contradictions, that makes it a drain on the nation’s financial and natural 
resources.324  
According to “affordability theory,” weaker building (and land use) codes help 
create affordable homes.325 The catch is that the structures are cheap and weak but, 
unfortunately, the affordability is critical for those who can least afford disaster recovery.326 
Affordability theory suggests that homeowners or purchasers who can afford a more 
expensive structure buy better quality and resilience. Less-stringent building codes result 
in increased disaster losses. Insured losses are paid by the underwriter, and uninsured losses 
are partially paid by the federal government for public buildings, or extremely low interest 
loans borne by the survivor who can least afford it, help from the American taxpayer, or 
philanthropic organizations.327 This is the crux of the problem: the cycle of damage-
reconstruction-damage is unsustainable. Comparing the unpredictability and intensity of 
climate change effects and the local community’s adaptive capacity to withstand such 
events, the timing of this issue is of critical importance. 
The United States spends billions of dollars in homeland disaster assistance and 
recovery—catastrophic burdens that, as previously mentioned, are not budgeted for.328 
Prior to 2017, the most expensive year in terms of disaster losses was 2005, mostly due to 
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Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, with losses of $215 billion.329 However, 2017 
eclipsed that notorious year of storms with another trio of intense Atlantic hurricanes: 
Harvey, Irma, and Maria.330 The combined estimate for all weather-related disasters in 2017 
was $306 billion, making it the costliest year for disasters in U.S. history.331 This illustrates 
a growing imbalance between anticipated weather and natural hazards and the quality of 
the built environment to withstand those hazards.  
According to a GAO study, the organizations responsible for developing building 
codes do not use climate predictive analytics.332 Additionally, not each entity even regularly 
updates climate information when reaching determinations on recommended code 
changes.333 For example, temperature data from a thirty-year period before 1991 is used to 
identify climate insulation needs. Data coordination is problematic. Little interaction takes 
place between code-developing organizations and federal agencies such as NOAA or 
FEMA that can share climate analytics. The GAO found that the organizations are 
ambivalent to this data.334 There appears to be no leadership authority within the code 
council system; it is, rather, a group of industry special interest groups that develop the 
building code system.335  
Because there is no mandate for building codes in the United States, states generally 
adopt the minimum International Code Council standards. There is no accountability. Local 
jurisdictions can “localize” codes even further.336 Building codes are an intrinsic part of our 
national identity and safety, yet it appears there are some significant gaps in the crossroads 
between building codes and disasters in the United States. 
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D. SUMMARY 
The way local jurisdictions zone and permit their land use for development is 
largely unregulated and lacks accountability. The same can be said for building codes. 
After Hurricane Andrew destroyed South Florida communities in 1992, the Miami-Dade 
government revised its residential building codes; they are now some of the strictest in the 
nation.337 Soon, other Florida counties adopted their codes, and eventually so did the state—
followed by some other states, as well. Codes and land use provide clear guidance derived 
from previous failed structures or protocols. Local and state governments could create 
restricted minimum standards to ensure increased stability and resilience.338  
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VI. CLIMATE ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 
EUROPEAN UNION, AND CANADA 
It ain’t about climate change anymore, it’s about climate adaptation. 
—Craig Fugate, former FEMA Administrator 
September 8, 2017339 
 
Before diving into a discussion about adapting to climate change, it is important to 
explain what adaptation means as it applies to climate. Although the terms adaptation and 
mitigation are often mentioned in the same discussion on risk reduction, they are not 
interchangeable; in many ways, these terms reflect opposite sides of the same problem. 
Mitigation addresses the front end—where human intervention may be able to stop the core 
triggers that are changing the climate in the first place, such as curbing emissions.340 
Adaptation addresses the consequential side of the same problem; it focuses on preparing 
for the outcome, or adapting human civilization to predicted impacts of climate change. 
For example, adaptation could mean building bigger and stronger infrastructure, 
genetically modifying food crops to withstand drought, elevating homes against sea-level 
rise, and other actions that secure the human environment. The global scientific community 
realizes that mitigation is now completely reactive; long-term action is needed to reverse 
the atmospheric damage that has already been done.341 The objective is that over time, 
through various societal changes and technological advancements, the human environment 
can mitigate damaging emissions pathways to reduce harmful atmospheric CO2 levels. 
However, the negative impacts of climate change are readily measureable. So, in the 
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meantime, the human environment must adapt to the observed impacts and prepare for 
future ones.   
This chapter explores the ways the United States, the European Union, and Canada 
are attempting to adapt to the changing climate. The threats of climate change—which 
affect every country on the planet—are perceived through a unique regional lens. Each 
region is different in geography and biology, as well as in human environment and 
education governance, and transparency all play a role in perception and eventual action. 
There is no straightforward path to climate resilience. Personalities and philosophies are as 
important as national culture and economies in influencing how nations respond to the 
threat. In this broad exploration, the United States, European Union, and Canada are similar 
in that they are all Global North nations. They share seasoned post-industrial democracies 
that are stable, privileged to have economies of scale, and capable of addressing climate 
challenges. All are active in the international arena and members of the United Nations.  
The United Nations has advanced the global climate change discussion since 1992, 
and in 1994 officially adopted the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC).342 The UNFCCC is a diplomatic global body that continues to be an 
important operative tool for unifying global climate action.343 The UNFCCC established 
working relationships with member nations, including the United States, to reduce 
damaging emissions through goal setting and benchmarking achievements.344 Member 
nations have met annually at the Conference of the Parties twenty-three times. The 
Conference of the Parties has made great strides, advancing numerous global concerns 
including climate change.345 The first global partnership to curb harmful human activities 
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was the previously discussed Kyoto Protocol in 1997, which set timeframes toward risk 
reduction.346  
A. THE UNITED STATES  
In discussing the challenge of climate adaptation in the United States, we must first 
recall the factors that interfere with national consensus. Briefly, as discussed previously, a 
significant portion of the U.S. political system dismisses that changes in the climate are 
linked to human activity—which includes emissions from burning fossil fuels (coal, oil, 
natural gas), food production, and the ongoing use of certain gases, such as refrigerant in 
air conditioners. The scientific community, however, claims that fossil fuels are the main 
contributor to the concentration of climate-altering chemicals in the Earth’s atmosphere, 
primarily CO2. The U.S. fossil fuel industry and other oil-dependent industries are 
influential in the country’s political system and have successfully obscured climate science 
making it a protracted political and public issue.347 These disputes focus on proof of human 
contribution, the cost of mitigation, and the market impacts of curbing emissions, which 
could result in profit losses for powerful multi-national corporations, as well as potential 
job losses. Climate adaptation is thus a sticking point for legislators.   
There was a time when the United States led the world in the field of environmental 
regulation: beginning in the 1970s, the U.S. government was on the forefront of 
environmental law and policy.348 The United States consistently developed progressive data 
and scientific advancements, championing global climate change mitigation and 
adaptation.349 As early as 1974, the United States and the European Union joined forces as 
leaders of a new era in combating climate impacts from industrialization.350 This did not 
change until the George W. Bush presidency (2001–2009), when the political parties 
became deeply biased and progress was stymied, especially amid refusal to ratify the Kyoto 
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Protocol, which was largely envisioned and negotiated by former Vice President Gore.351. 
Special interest groups and financial establishments in the United States had gained more 
federal decision–making influence on environmental issues with state politicians.352 These 
interests overshadowed local or state concerns, and the lack of unity and consistency 
increased tension stateside and internationally.353  
The United States was behind global initiatives when the Obama administration 
made significant headway to align climate direction and unify the nation. Throughout both 
of his terms, Obama persistently assembled a climate change infrastructure through the 
executive branch, directing federal agencies to develop climate adaptation plans. His 
guidance also sought to make the climate issue transparent using state-of-the-art 
equipment, access, and public openness to guide decision making. Signed on August 29, 
2016, the Paris Agreement marked the culmination of Obama’s effort to plant the United 
States as a global climate agreement participant; its adoption was his signature moment in 
bringing the United States to the world climate initiative.354 In an effort to bring all federal 
agencies on board with the detailed national security threats reported by the intelligence 
and defense sectors, Obama issued a memorandum on “Climate Change and National 
Security” on September 21, 2016.355 It created a detailed performance plan for climate 
impacts to be considered in all federal policies, doctrine, and national security matters to 
initiate actions toward fulfilling obligations in the Paris Agreement.  
Within six months of signing the Paris Agreement, U.S. leadership changed 
significantly when Trump was elected president.356 In the first three months of his 
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administration, Trump eliminated six orders that shaped federal, and thereby state, 
direction and performance objectives for climate mitigation and guidance.357 In his fifth 
month, he withdrew the United States from the Paris Agreement.358 In his eighth month, a 
critical executive order for flood adaptation was also rescinded; ironically, this happened 
two weeks before a string of hurricanes decimated parts of Texas, Florida, the U.S. Virgin 
Islands, and Puerto Rico.359 There is also concern about how the Trump administration will 
handle the much-awaited update of the National Climate Assessment. The 2014 National 
Climate Assessment is a deeply researched report that comprehensively captures the 
impacts of U.S. climate threats—both today, and in the future.360 Over 300 specialists and 
a federal committee of 60 participants, including world-renowned climate experts, 
developed the assessment, which is due to be updated every four years. It is compiled and 
hosted by the U.S. Global Change Research Program, which was initiated by the Obama 
administration. The draft update has been submitted to the White House and is currently 
awaiting issue amid public concerns that the integrity of the science will be amended by 
the presidential administration.361  
Meanwhile, the United States does not have a codified national climate adaptation 
policy. The closest the United States has gotten to a national agenda on climate adaptation 
was Obama’s Executive Order 13653, that called for the Interagency Climate Change 
Adaptation Task Force and required federal agencies to submit climate adaptation plans, 
as previously mentioned.362 Most agencies complied. However, since the United States is 
no longer a signatory on any climate agreement, there is no baseline from which the nation 
                                                 
357 Madison Park, “6 Obama Climate Policies That Trump Orders Change,” CNN, March 28, 2017, 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/28/politics/climate-change-obama-rules-trump/index.html.  
358 Merica, “Trump Changes U.S. Approach to Climate Change.”  
359 Barack Obama, Establishing Discipline and Accountability in the Environmental Review and 
Permitting Process for Infrastructure Projects, Executive Order 13807 (Washington, DC: Executive Office 
of the President, 2017), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2017/08/24/2017-18134/establishing-
discipline-and-accountability-in-the-environmental-review-and-permitting-process-for.  
360 USGCRP, “National Climate Assessment.”  
361 Lisa Friedman, “Scientists Fear Trump Will Dismiss Blunt Climate Report,” New York Times, 
August 7, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/07/climate/climate-change-drastic-warming-
trump.html.  
362 Obama, Preparing the United States for the Impacts of Climate Change. 
86 
can build a framework that is in harmony with international agreements. While Congress 
recognizes that the response and recovery costs from increasingly frequent and destructive 
natural disasters places an unsustainable economic burden on the American taxpayer, they 
have mostly side-stepped any legislation that might improve outcomes.363 Singularly, the 
Senate and House Representatives condemn their own lack of action.364 Meanwhile, the 
clock keeps ticking faster as the United States, a global superpower, makes no commitment 
to address the global security threat posed by changes in the climate.   
Given these complex struggles, it is worthwhile to explore how other developed 
nations are adapting to escalating climate impacts and their national security threat. 
Members of the European Union, Canada, and several Asian nations are actively 
developing and implementing some level of national climate adaptation planning. In 2010, 
a national adaptation planning process was created for lesser-developed countries through 
the UNFCCC.365 The process includes guidelines, research data, and materials, among 
other incentives.  
B. THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Although it has existed since the 1950s, the European Union was officially 
established in 1993, following nearly fifty years of trade agreements and the European 
Economic Community. Encouraged to unify for global competitiveness, member states 
grew in number; following the destruction of the Berlin Wall in 1989, more countries 
joined as a symbol of European unification.366 A unitary currency, the euro, was established 
for economic harmony. Primary objectives of the union are seamless transportation of 
commodities, services, people, and money, and ensuring environmental protection and 
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cohesive international security.367 Today, the European Union has twenty-eight member 
states. However, the United Kingdom is preparing to withdraw from the European Union, 
thereby reducing the number of participating member states to twenty-seven.368 How 
problematic this turns out to be is of considerable concern for the greater European Union 
because the United Kingdom is a vital piece of the EU framework, especially as a leader 
of the climate program.369 
The 1997 Kyoto Protocol was the flagship initiative that drove the EU climate 
program, leveraging obligatory “common coordinated policies and measures” (CCPMs) 
for member states.370 Individually, member states must pass complementary laws and 
policies across economic sectors, including resilience policies. A triadic approach—the 
Kyoto Protocol, CCPM, and membership codification—solidifies a unified and 
progressive path.371 The European Union has equally declared climate change impacts a 
threat to its national security. Concerns surround increased hostilities, sustenance 
uncertainties, abuse of international markets and commodities trading, and surges of mass 
migration.372 Questions have arisen over realignment of defense and security, shifts in 
economic stability, civil unrest in and around the EU countries, and stability of authority.373 
It is known that nearby regions already experiencing fragile leadership or economic 
strength will be most at risk for disruption by climate change and least able to adapt. 
Regional pressures on the European community will increase as climate change becomes 
intolerable for locations ravaged by drought or other escalating climate impacts, leaving 
these areas uninhabitable. For example, by 2025, almost 1.5 billion people will experience 
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crop failures and 2 billion people water shortages.374 This is just one example of resource 
sensitivity that will trigger multiple conditions that affect all world populations.375 While 
EU climate impacts are similar to the United States’, the manifested threat is different. 
Within the last few years, climate security has become more integrated into the 
larger EU security posture. The European Union is primarily concerned with the external 
threats that will manifest over time, rather than internal strife and resource depletion. Its 
collective traditional course has been through soft power and multilateralism; however, 
there is a perception that the union is shifting toward a more defensive posture.376 Indeed, 
the European Union has taken an international leadership role in the climate agenda.377 
Over time, this acceptance of responsibility for science, data, coordination, and 
representation has led to adaptation policies.378 The union’s members have unique yet 
tangentially shared histories and ancestries. In an effort to leverage their combined 
strength, they have come together on shared priorities, democratic governance, security 
concerns, and other matters that serve to strengthen their geo-strategic unity. Their strength 
is supported through expertise and regulatory principles.379 Rule of law is the priority for 
EU member nations, along with commitment to agreements—including climate 
initiatives.380 This means that signatories are bound by their agreement to enter into a 
membership relationship. That is not to say internal tension is absent; differences of 
opinion and differences of outcomes exist and are respected within the rule of law.381 
However, the shared membership lends itself to cooperation, and the nations work together 
on common threats. Unlike the United States, the European Union has not built a robust 
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emergency management response and recovery agency to address natural hazards.382 
Although they might, therefore, be lagging behind in preparedness to respond to natural 
hazard events, the military strategy has recognized the future of defense may well include 
climate-related events.383  
The European Union adopted a climate adaptation strategy in 2013, which 
recognizes member nations’ vulnerability to climate impacts.384 By 2050, their research 
warned, as many as 90 thousand deaths could be attributed to climate impacts in the 
European Union alone, with an estimated annual cost of €250 billion annually.385 Currently, 
fifteen member states are initiating and implementing their own national adaptation 
strategies. The EU approach fosters sharing of best practices and peer pressure among 
member states to engage in adaptation measures. Individually, the United Kingdom has 
initiated numerous projects, including climate change risk assessments and a national 
adaptation plan, as well as climate resilience toolkits for businesses. Sweden and the 
Netherlands have focused on flood events.  
C. CANADA 
Much like the United States, Canada has a colorful history with the climate change 
issue. Stephen J. Harper was the Canadian prime minister from 2006 to 2015. A member 
of the Conservative Party, Harper was not a believer of climate threats, or climate change; 
in the first five years of his administration, over 2,000 government scientists were released 
and scores of high-profile research programs eliminated.386 Most cutbacks were felt in 
environmental programs, such as those focusing on hazardous materials contamination 
incidents, food inspections, pollution, clean water, and climate change. Harper was 
controversial for his willingness to avoid transparency—to the point of draconian 
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measures. He placed gag orders on government employees, prohibiting them from 
interacting with the media, and drained science libraries of historical data.387 By 2011, 
Harper had withdrawn from the Kyoto Protocol, emphasizing that the United States emits 
20 percent of global pollutants and yet was not a participant of the protocol.388 In 2013, 
demonstrators across the country demanded transparency and for Canada to “stand up for 
science in the public interest.”389 Citizens were beginning to see fish mutations and 
pollution in surrounding watersheds and, not incidentally, the Alberta oil sands were in full 
swing.390 While oil sands production was 1 million barrels per day in 2004, it increased to 
2.5 million by 2017; Harper had backed economic development to extract the oil from the 
tar sands, despite environmental consequences.391  
On November 4, 2015, Justin Trudeau was sworn as Canada’s 23rd prime minister. 
A member of Canada’s Liberal Party, Trudeau would become a committed partner with 
the United States and Obama.392 In a reversal of current U.S. politics, the Trudeau 
administration is now dismantling the Harper-era’s extreme economic-based agenda. 
Agreeing to the Keystone XL Pipeline, Trudeau is aggressively pursuing a climate change 
agenda for adaptation and mitigation. One year after Trudeau’s election, on November 4, 
2016, Canada officially became a full party to the Paris Agreement.393 However, it has yet 
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to be seen how he will balance Canada’s carbon-rich oil industry with a progressive climate 
action stance.  
Meanwhile, the government of Canada has developed the Pan-Canadian 
Framework on Clean Growth and Climate Change, and the Federal Adaptation Policy 
Framework for Climate Change.394 The framework clearly delineates the federal role in 
climate adaptation and when it is fitting for the federal government to act.395 In addition to 
this comprehensive documentation of the country’s approach to mitigating human activity 
that contributes to climate change, the framework also addresses climate resilience and 
adaptation in collaboration with provinces, territories, and the private sector. Key focal 
points for adaptation include establishment of a national climate services center for 
authoritative, scientifically backed information. Additionally, the federal government is 
taking a leadership role in building local capacity to incorporate adaptation planning, 
infrastructure investment, enhanced building codes, health concerns, and special interest in 
areas at increased geographic risk and vulnerability.396 The country has developed 
comprehensive public information websites, too, that discuss the steps the nation is taking 
for climate adaptation. Climate impacts of concern include the Arctic area, as well as 
adaptation for indigenous peoples in the far north and shoreline areas. According to 
Canadian data, over 70 percent of the Canadian shorelines are demarcated by Arctic ice.397 
Climate impacts in these areas are already being observed and will change key survival 
tactics depended upon for generations.  
Canada has found value in focusing on public engagement and climate-resilient 
building codes; the country is implementing infrastructure improvements, such as 
increasing snow, ice melt, and storm-water runoff capacity in the city of Winnipeg, which 
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is predicated to save more than $40 billion in flood-related disasters.398 Coastal efforts are 
underway to employ land-use strategies informed by risk assessments completed with 
engineering techniques, and natural resource management to reduce risk and increase 
capacity and resilience. The federal government is also working with local landowners to 
restore drained wetlands to provide natural flood control and drought protection under the 
banner of climate adaptation.399 In 2017, the government developed the Working Group on 
Adaptation and Climate Resilience, which is drafting a comprehensive report on the 
nation’s ability to adapt and be resilient as the climate changes.400 If the United States can 
find a center point, there is much to learn from the Canadian model, especially when it 
comes to engaging the country’s citizens. 
In summary, important nations in the Global North, and around the world, accept  
that climate adaptation is becoming increasingly necessary. Adaptation of the human 
environment to climate extremes requires understanding of what scientific extremes can 
mean in terms of impact and destructive forces on that environment. While many extreme 
events may be similar in nature, each nation has unique characteristics and capacity to 
adapt their societies and governments to include climate extremes. The United States is no 
different. As a nation by which rule of law is the backbone of civil society, the United 
States is well suited to encourage climate adaptation through modifications of existing laws 
ranging from source point challenges to incentives through government programs and 
grants, including the Robert T. Stafford Act.   
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VII. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
All truth passes through three stages. First, it is ridiculed. Second, it is 
violently opposed. Third, it is accepted as being self-evident. 
—Arthur Schopenhauer401 
 
This thesis has provided an opportunity for discovery of critical elements that frame 
societal resilience to the impacts of a changing climate. In doing so, it has discussed climate 
change drivers and their impacts, including the cascading effects that render the climate a 
national security threat. It has also explored the importance of the personal convictions and 
leadership of U.S. presidents in framing a national narrative over the last several decades, 
and has examined specific U.S. laws and policies that affect national resilience to climate 
impacts, as well the United States’ progress on climate adaptation as it compares to other 
peer nations. These viewpoints provide a foundational response to the research questions 
that illustrates the dichotomous and complex discussion surrounding climate change and 
adaptation. This chapter analyzes this discussion through the filter of the three research 
questions. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 1: NATIONAL SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS  
Is the U.S. government placing the American public at risk by failing to 
create resilience standards appropriate to the threats posed by natural 
hazards, including hazards that will be exacerbated by climate change?  
The research produced and discussed in this thesis demonstrates that the United 
States is not doing enough to safeguard the public against the encroaching effects of climate 
change. The intelligence community and the Defense Department have publically shared 
their concerns about the immediate and future impacts of climate change on our national 
security.402  But, this is not happening under our current administration. In a September 
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2016 address at the Intelligence & National Security Summit, Director of National 
Intelligence James R. Clapper stated his belief that climate change will be “an underlying 
meta-driver of unpredictable instability.”403 He spoke about security concerns exacerbated 
by climate change, including basic human necessities such as availability of food and 
water.404 The Department of Defense and the National Security Council, too, have released 
independent reports on the climate change threat to the United States, which includes 
homeland threats evolving from global impacts.405 These reports discuss national security 
concerns over the future stability of food and water, coastal risk to sea-level rise, the 
frequency and intensity of natural disasters, international instability aggravated or triggered 
by climate, and fundamental human security.406 DHS also issued statements of concern 
about America’s aging infrastructure, seasonal growing climates, and the impact from the 
Arctic opening to sea traffic.407 Climate change, a critical concern in the most recent DHS 
Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, is seen as an enabler for terrorism, legal and 
illegal migration, natural disasters, and health risks from emergent diseases, such as West 
Nile virus.408     
The climate security threat to the United States is real; while they may not be 
consistently apparent, over time, threats are emerging.409 Scientists postulate that the faster 
emissions can be curbed, the more likely it is that the climate can stabilize and we may 
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avoid the most extreme climate impacts.410 Scientists are concerned that Earth’s elevated 
temperatures will reach a tipping point, setting in motion a feedback loop that reinforces 
extreme weather events that cannot be easily reversed.411 According to the National 
Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the last three years set new 
warming temperature records in a consecutive string of twenty-one years above average.412 
NOAA’s global temperature assessment of the first six months of 2018 has already showed 
it is the fourth hottest year on record.413 Over a thousand scientists around the world 
anticipate local temperatures to increase 2.5 to 10° F during the twenty-first century.414  
Climate events are already increasing worldwide, not just in the United States.415 In 
fact, the United States has experienced fewer extreme climate events than other regions. It 
has become an issue of risk tolerance, data, and resources, and using that information to 
adapt by creating thresholds of tolerance to offset the risk.416 This simple concept is 
unfortunately complex to achieve, and the worldwide and domestic impacts matter to the 
national security of the United States.417 For example, climatologists speculate the Earth 
will experience more intense rain caused by the greenhouse effect.418 They cannot say how 
much rain will fall in a given location, but we are seeing that traditional rain patterns may 
change, evidenced by recent disasters in the United States such as two significant rain 
events in Louisiana in 2016 and Hurricane Harvey in Texas in 2017. Both events were 
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unusual for the volume of rain and the persistence due to stalled movement. Combined 
with higher temperatures, drought extremes will also emerge in areas accustomed to 
receiving replenishing rains. As the soil becomes increasingly dry, wildfires will rage and 
other areas will experience unlivable periodic torrents. As a result, people will migrate.  
Coastal areas everywhere are experiencing harsher living conditions. Sea-level rise, 
storm surges, and subsidence are causing increased erosion and road and sewer flooding 
(e.g., in Miami), and will soon allow water into first-level buildings. Saltwater intrusion 
into freshwater aquifers will also result as tides creep higher. The economic impact, 
including to real estate, can be huge if infrastructure is not adapted to accommodate these 
changing conditions.419 Furthermore, traditional agricultural areas may become too hot or 
dry, and the growing seasons may become shorter or longer. This will push food crops 
further north, or cause the land to lose its entire flora and fauna species, which will be 
unaccustomed to the new growing conditions.420 Similarly, polar ice melt is creating new 
fishing, drilling, and shipping lanes. This opens worrisome potential for conflict over land 
rights with native peoples and other countries willing to militarily defend their claim.  
Today, the United States treats each disaster event as though it is a single, 
unrepeatable event. When treated in isolation, each event focuses only on policy, 
regulation, and securing taxpayer funds to repair the damage. When the next event occurs, 
the same formula is applied. This approach does not build deliberate resilience capacity 
over time. Climate adaptation should be an all-systems approach that views the scope of 
the problem from a broad, long-term view. The U.S. posture and strategy for handling these 
events must be clear, robust and committed.421  
The U.S. intelligence community, Department of Defense, and a consortium of 
retired military leaders have pronounced that climate change is a national security threat; 
it therefore deserves focused attention and leadership. Yet, it is not occurring in the current 
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administration. Nor is there a path toward addressing these concerns from a congressional 
or executive level. The United States has not maintained a consistent and committed path 
to safeguard the American public from the impacts of climate change. For decades, the 
United States has avoided national commitment to a climate change science, mitigation, 
and adaptation.422 If there were ever a time to incentivize a nation to action, it is now.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 2: DISHARMONY OF LAWS, REGULATIONS, 
AND POLICIES 
What is preventing the nation from understanding the risk of climate 
security threats, and the need to adapt to those threats? 
There are many complex impediments preventing the United States from adopting 
higher risk awareness to climate change. The politicized nature of the problem prevents 
sustained steps toward national adaptation. Political leadership must be unified on the 
science in order to move the nation toward comprehensive planning and actionable 
changes, which must come from laws and policy that enable resilience. Currently laws and 
policy that frame emergency management, building codes and housing development, land 
use, and even federal investment in infrastructure do not have guidance on climate change 
adaptation. Yet these sectors play a critical role in any attempt to seek climate resilience. 
An evaluation of effectiveness should determine if these laws and policies promote a 
system that condones minimum performance standards in the face of intensifying threats. 
In the recent past, the Obama administration set the United States on an achievable 
track comparable with other Western nations’ efforts by providing goals and milestones.423 
More importantly, the administration built a foundation of interagency teamwork at the 
White House to increase the scope of climate adaptation accomplishments.424 However, a 
significant gap between federal and state support persists; action from Congress is needed 
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to provide state incentives and assistance on climate adaptation progress.425 Meanwhile, 
several states and some municipal governments recognize the seriousness of climate threat 
and its future impacts. Fourteen states completed climate change adaptation plans, and 
some are making excellent progress to include sustainability in their growth and 
development choices.426  
Some private-sector and non-governmental organizations are coming forward with 
incentives to help major cities embrace sustainability, and to demonstrate progress and 
show leadership where otherwise there is none. The Rockefeller Foundation’s “100 
Resilient Cities” competition is one such initiative.427 The twenty-two U.S. cities 
participating in this challenge will receive significant grant funds and planning support to 
increase their capability for sustainable projects.428 In 2014, Obama also sponsored the 
$1 billion National Disaster Resilience Competition, in which sixty-seven disaster-
impacted jurisdictions competed to share special public–private partnership assistance 
through the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s block grants.429  
Yet the political debate struggles to reveal whether mitigating impacts before the 
onset of severe consequences is economically beneficial.430 It is becoming increasingly 
relevant to address steps toward informed climate change adaptation, at a minimum. 
Political unity is important because it is the nexus where decision making and support will 
occur. If constituents cannot support a decisive course of action, the collective way forward 
will be more complex; laws will struggle to be passed and national cohesiveness on a 
critical issue—both today and for future generations—will suffer. While any forward 
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momentum is positive for the nation, federal leadership must commit to a path.431 The 
dismantling of proficient foundations for progress from president to president illustrates 
how such important courses can be treated randomly, and not without serious implications 
to the public.432  
As the United States is impacted by natural disasters routinely, some impacts are 
repetitive. Communities remain vulnerable to hazards. When they are situated in unsafe 
locations, or not built to withstand today’s climate, they are certainly not safe for the future 
climate. Expenses to the federal treasury to rebuild communities that do not incorporate 
the climate adaptation measures needed to withstand the next event, especially future 
extreme events, are wasteful.433 Currently, the Stafford Act does not require applicants to 
consider future climate models to receive federal emergency assistance or public 
assistance.434  
For example, a bridge washes out from torrential rains or unprecedented storm 
water runoff from a sudden rain bomb. The area receives a presidential disaster declaration 
and authorized use of the Stafford Act. For the public assistance program to repair or 
replace public infrastructure, the Stafford Act requires determination on cost of repairs not 
to exceed 50 percent of the cost of replacement to pre-disaster condition.435 As previously 
established, there is no requirement to use forensics to determine the capacity necessary to 
withstand another similar event, or consideration of future modeling to offset for climate 
extremes. The only requirement is that the repair or replacement will be conducted to pre-
disaster condition and the only potential resilience boost will be using current local codes. 
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Should the community wish to have the damaged infrastructure considered for mitigation 
(to make it bigger, better, stronger), it must ask the FEMA caseworker to provide 
consideration for “406 Mitigation” measures.436 Most communities do not know to ask, and 
some state agencies are just now realizing they can. However, it does not always work; 406 
Mitigation has challenges within FEMA because it is time consuming and slows down the 
cadence of the program’s get-in, get-out methodology. It is a problem for communities that 
want to leverage federal assistance to offset future damages. While Obama issued the 
Federal Flood Risk Management Standard (FFRMS)—which did exactly that—the 
standard was not codified by law and was one of several policy retractions initiated by the 
Trump administration in 2017.437 Congress has not passed a complementary law to protect 
provisions, even though the states would benefit from such measures. This type of 
discontinuity overshadows the national urgency and demonstrated need for climate 
adaptation.  
Other policy measures important to national security are the methodologies for land 
use planning and building code application at the local level. The research for this thesis 
identified that there are no federal regulations mandating building codes or risk evaluations 
for land use. Of equal interest is the lack of accountability for those policies in order to 
receive pre- or post-disaster federal grants. Federal disaster declarations qualify 
communities for millions, possibly billions, of federal taxpayer assistance without any 
commitment beyond rebuilding to locally adopted codes and maintaining the 
infrastructure.438 Maintenance condition lends itself to a degree of qualitative subjectivity; 
each structure evaluation can result in a varied determination. Note, too, that although a 
community may adopt, for example, the International Building Codes, that community also 
has the authority to adapt the codes to its needs or risks. There is no formula for evaluating 
a degree to which codes can or should be modified to fit the risk profile. In other words, 
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jurisdictions can change the codes without oversight or justification unless a state 
requirement exists. In the event of a disaster, neither the community nor the state on whose 
behalf the codes have been locally entrusted is held responsible for the outcome, unless it 
is obvious the structure was improperly maintained.  
The building industry is self-organized into a consortium-like body that provides 
the professional guidance lawmakers use to draft and write policies. In the case of building 
codes, there are few governing laws, primarily concerning inclusion of federal agencies for 
certain standards development when necessary. It is not clear when that would be 
necessary, or what federal agencies are needed.439 A syndicate of seventeen industry 
organizations determines codes, and reviews and replaces them every three years.440 The 
Government Accountability Office’s November 2016 performance audit for climate 
change clearly shows that the consortium participants find integration of climate science 
troublesome and irregular.441 The consortium also acknowledged local communities 
determine their own risk to hazards and choose the level of resilience measures through 
adaptive building codes.442 Recall that there is no further oversight on the strength or 
resilience of the homes built in America today.  
While affordability has been a repeated impediment to sustainable construction, the 
costs do not appear to be significant enough to offset the benefits.443 Home prices are driven 
by local markets and are not significantly impacted by safety or resilience.444 Most 
homebuyers are unaware of the differences in local codes and enforcement commitments. 
Purchasing a home should not be a gamble. Low-income residents are particularly 
vulnerable and have the least resources to invest in recovery; put another way, low-income 
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sectors benefit the most from strong codes to offset future losses.445 When neighborhoods 
are destroyed, the impacts run deeper than just the cost or the disruption to the homeowner 
as he or she replaces the—though both are significant. But the impacts also displacement, 
cleanup, landfill, loss of infrastructure, and other costs that average approximately 
$100,000 per building (in 2014 dollars), costs shouldered by the American taxpayer on 
behalf of “the U.S. government.”446  
As this reflection points out, the average American believes the government 
provides safety nets through the passage and implementation of equitable laws and policy. 
The minimum standards of building codes, land use policy, and even some emergency 
management policies are no longer sustainable to the climate threat. This should be a 
problem of accountability: laws and policies are not serving the best interest of consumers 
or the nation’s capacity for resilience to a known national security threat. Minimum 
standards should be continually rated to the climate threat for effectiveness, rather than for 
tolerance for the lowest possible allowance. We must remember, as well, that national 
leadership is needed to put the nation on a path toward resilience. The threat of climate 
change requires clear thinking and collaboration among national leaders. Although 
regulatory guidance is unpopular in American politics today, in the case of climate change 
adaptation it is a necessary power. Laws and policies must recognize the depth of the 
problem, and be accordingly modified. National action is necessary, and it must come 
through a systemic, unified response to the key drivers that enable knowable, and 
preventable, vulnerabilities.   
C. RESEARCH QUESTION 3: UNIVERSAL INDEPENDENCE TO A 
COLLECTIVE PROBLEM 
What lessons can the United States learn from our allies to establish an 
effective climate change adaptation protocol?  
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Our allies, namely the European Union and Canada, have internalized a committed 
path toward climate adaptation and resilience. They recognize the threat that climate 
change poses to their national security and are taking steps to adapt their societies to its 
impacts. To face the threat, they have adopted a risk-based culture of decision-making and 
have been transparent about the threat with their citizens. They have websites up and 
running with consumer-friendly information about the status of climate adaptation. 
Furthermore, EU member nations, Canada, Latin America, and some African and Asian 
nations are actively developing and implementing national climate adaptation planning. 
The national adaptation planning process—which the UNFCCC created in 2010 for lesser-
developed countries—includes guidelines, research, data, materials, and incentives.  
The common denominator is transparency, and proclaimed political commitments 
to climate change adaptation. The United States, European Union, and Canada each has 
informative websites; the U.S. Global Change Research Program website 
(GlobalChange.gov) is a first-rate web platform, and Canada and the European Union have 
enabled similar, if not as robust, public-facing websites. In the United States, however, 
unlike in the other regions, there is little effort to shape the culture toward risk-based 
decision-making. Risk-based decision making considers growth, development, and risk-
tolerance against extreme weather. Considerations include capacity for disaster response, 
recovery, and economic factors that will be affected by climate change. FEMA’s concept 
of hazard mitigation planning could offer a path for improvement.447 As with many federal 
programs, FEMA’s hazard mitigation planning it is an incentive program that encourages 
communities to prepare for hazards and qualifies them to participate in certain grant 
programs.448  
The European Union is not immune to some of the same natural hazards as the 
United States, including human-caused and technological concerns, though they may not 
share all of the same risks. According to the European Commission, the European Union 
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expended €100 billion (approximately $120 billion) in disaster funds during an eleven-year 
period from 2005 through 2016.449 The top EU hazards are flooding and extreme weather, 
closely followed by forest fires.450 The European disaster risk management community 
indicates that climate change is influencing stronger and more frequent disasters.451 In the 
United States, disasters during the period from 1980 to 2013 cost more than $1.07 trillion; 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 was the most expensive disaster (at a cost of $196 billion), and 
Hurricane Sandy in 2012 was also notable ($65.7 billion).452 During the same time period, 
drought and hurricanes comprised more than $768 billion in losses.453 Cumulatively, 2017 
will likely be the costliest year for U.S. disasters in history.  
Canada also shares similar hazards with the United States. As in the United States, 
flooding is the most common, and expensive, hazard in Canada.454 However, landslides and 
earthquakes occur more frequently. A report from the Canadian Parliamentary Budget 
Officer acknowledges that climate change is a likely factor influencing the severity of 
weather events in Canada.455 The report predicts that winter storms will triple, and that 
between 2016 and 2020 annual flood costs will double ($673 million) over the previous 
five-year period (2011 to 2015). The budget officer report claims lack of coordination with 
the United States has negatively affected flood-related incidents and increased costs of 
                                                 
449 “Funding Opportunities for Disaster Risk Management within EU Cohesion Policy,” European 
Commission, last updated October 2016, http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/policy/themes/climate-
change/funding-risk-prevention/.  
450 “Overview of Natural and Man-Made Disaster Risks the European Union May Face,” European 
Commission, May 23, 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/sites/echo-site/files/swd_2017_176_overview_of_ 
risks_2.pdf.  
451 “European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations, Disaster Risk Management,” 
European Commission, accessed October 16, 2017, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/aid/countries/ 
factsheets/thematic/disaster_risk_management_en.pdf.  
452 Brusentsev and Vroman, Disasters in the United States, 45. 
453 Brusentsev and Vroman, 45. 
454 “Natural Hazards,” Government of Canada, accessed October 16, 2017, www.canada.ca/en/ 
services/policing/emergencies/hazards.html.  
455 “Estimate of the Average Annual Cost for Disaster Financial Assistance Arrangements Due to 
Weather Events,” Office of the Parliamentary Budget Officer, February 25, 2016, http://www.pbo-
dpb.gc.ca/web/default/files/Documents/Reports/2016/DFAA/DFAA_EN.pdf.  
105 
disasters.456 While the United States and Canada experience more frequent and more 
expensive climate-related losses than the European Union, both the Canadian and 
European Union estimates for disaster losses are escalating now, not in the distant future.  
The United States is a nation of laws—as are the European Union and Canada. The 
European Union, however, has conditional membership and its agreements are binding.457 
Member-state cooperation is secured upon joining, and members participate in climate 
strategies. The U.S. Constitution predates the European Union, and it predates climate 
issues. U.S. states enjoy a level of home-rule autonomy in this regard. To develop an EU-
type climate model, states must be incentivized or rules codified by law. Thus, the 
recommendations in the next chapter may seem draconian in a period of deregulation.  
D. CONCLUSION 
The United States is fortunate to have the wealth and capability to wrestle with the 
implications of climate change, and to address the adaptation issues raised in this thesis. In 
doing so, the country must recognize the importance of rule of law, long-term vision 
(beyond election term limits and election cycles), the value of a national dialogue, and 
decisive action toward reducing the national threat to increasing weather extremes. 
However, the path toward solutions in the interest of national security is troubling. The 
urgency of the problem is not being met with the leadership needed to make reasonable 
solutions actionable.  
Accountability is a key gap. The United States fosters an individualistic lifestyle, 
which is increasingly permeating our governance and culture—independence and 
individualism in this lifestyle become misleadingly synonymous. If the new norm in 
American culture is to preserve the misnomer of “independence” (individualism) at the 
expense of others, most especially the greater good, the climate issue becomes problematic. 
Although the purpose of this thesis is not to analyze individualism and community 
dynamics, it is important to recognize the significant influence this concept may have in 
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distracting the United States from a reasonable climate discussion. Accountability is further 
challenged by election cycles, which may have a disproportionate influence on the climate 
discussion. Climate adaptation is not amenable to the short-term fixes that are compatible 
with U.S. election cycles. However, congressional and executive committees are developed 
on important issues at all levels of government and engage transitioning members, 
regardless of political influence or term limits. A committee system is needed for climate 
science and long-term planning for the future of the country and continuity of leadership. 
This committee would need to advise and collaborate with other federal agencies to address 
extreme weather and amend public policy on resilience standards. For example, all public 
infrastructure projects should use minimum standards that include increased intensity 
based on current and predicted climate science. This may mean reinstating Obama’s 
Executive Order 13690, Establishing a Federal Flood Risk Management Standard, and 
furthering the concept to include all extreme weather risks. Building codes and land use 
planning must envision changing environments and what the risks mean to the public—to 
include the individual family—so that citizens are protected as much as the developer and 
land use planner are. A national risk database is needed to harmonize data and usage, and 
to enhance communities’ risk resilience.  
A national conversation about climate is important, but politics are far too infused 
in the topic. The government must enable honest transparency and engagement. Public 
programs, national messaging, and guidance should be developed and robustly delivered. 
Nationally, climate adaptation is under-recognized, as are the devastating and erosive 
effects of climate change, and their capacity to harm the country. We need intelligent 
federal policies and actions—in partnership with the federal, state, tribal, territorial, and 
local governments. This means we need to reimagine what is considered “safe.” Images of 
Puerto Rico following Hurricane Maria are sobering; they show the frightening realm of 
consequences when a community is deep in debt and living with inadequate, or eroding, 
infrastructure. 
To build resilience at this level, we need action. As a leading superpower with 
complex dynamics, the nation’s security against any threat should not be compromised 
over one individual’s belief. Politics aside, the climate threat is real, it is growing, and it is 
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devastatingly destructive. Resilience can be achieved, but only with a clear-eyed 
understanding of the nation’s vulnerability and a deliberate process to eliminate the risk. 
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VIII. RECOMMENDATION 
Those of us who are privileged to be alive in these early decades of the 21st 
century are called upon to make decisions of great consequence. 
—Al Gore458 
 
A. NATIONAL CLIMATE CONVERSATION: CONGRESSIONAL PANEL 
Like many topics in the United States today, climate change is a divisive issue 
among politicians, and equally among citizens. In order to work through this important 
national security threat at the level it deserves, Congress should enact legislative 
framework that is independent of political manipulation through a panel of highly qualified 
science advisers and a range of climate positions. Consensus on climate narrative and 
actionable processes must be determined on a national scale, as is appropriate to its national 
security threat. Their focus must be on climate risk reduction to the public through 
messaging, smart development and growth practices, and codification of mitigation 
techniques, and a thorough review of existing laws to support preparing the public for 
climate change. A climate consensus and recommendations for mitigation and adaptation 
are necessary to defend the nation against this emerging threat. Citizens must be part of the 
engagement process. Conclusions of this panel must be respected by both houses of 
Congress and the executive branch and, if necessary, should pass constitutional review. 
Policy should be developed and codified toward a national resilience and adaptation 
protocol.  
B. NATIONAL RESILIENCE AND CLIMATE ADAPTATION PROTOCOL 
The purpose of a national protocol is to provide achievable goals through national 
policy and guidance to create systemic national resilience for the people to withstand 
climate extremes.  
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(1) Organizational Leadership and Authorities 
• Create a cabinet-level Department of Climate, Research, and Adaptation 
(DCRA). The Department is responsible for science data, utilizing existing 
federal science agencies to create and maintain climate data, modeling, 
and sharing platforms. This Department will create policy teams to 
collaborate with all federal agencies for strategic and implementation 
platforms.   
• Create a complementary Congressional Climate Adaptation Oversight 
Committee.  
• Develop and implement a National Adaptation Protocol (key components 
described in subsection 4).  
• Create executive assignment to DHS.  
• Implement National Adaptation Protocol through DHS in FEMA, in 
conjunction with all federal agencies under the National Planning 
Frameworks (National Preparedness Goal).  
• Codify the Federal Food Risk Management Standard (FFRMS) into law.  
• Modify FFRMS to include all projects where federal funds are applied, to 
include climate change mitigation and adaptation through 2100.  
(2) Legislative Changes to the Stafford Act (and Amendments) for the 
Following Programs 
• National Adaptation Protocol incentive for all states, territories, tribes and 
local governments to receive federal assistance.  
• Public Assistance (44 C.F.R. § 206.226). 
• Section 406 Mitigation to be applied to all public infrastructures.   
• Hazard Mitigation Planning (44 C.F.R. § 201). 
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• National Adaptation Protocol requirements and annual state accountability 
reviews.   
(3) Modify the National Preparedness Goal 
• Codified the goal by law. 
• Include intensified climate threats utilizing DCRA data and modeling. 
Require proof of annual adaptation measures implemented through state 
Hazard Mitigation Plans and quantifiable performance enhancements 
resulting in response reduction. 
(4) Key Components 
• Develop National Natural Hazard and Climate Adaptation Risk Database 
available for nationwide use, for local use in building codes, land use, 
hazard mitigation, etc.   
• Require scientific climate modeling to utilize decadal projections through 
year 2100, adding one decade for every decade passed, and have this data 
reflected in Hazard Mitigation Plans.    
• Review and modify all Minimum Standards for Building Codes, especially 
residential-level codes, to withstand reasonable risk to infrastructure from 
increased all-weather threats.  
• In conjunction with the White House Climate Team, create regulatory 
requirements for building codes above minimum thresholds. Develop 
national land use regulatory profiles for risk assessments. Provide 
learning/classes. This will include community and state accountability for 
sliding scale–type awards for public assistance grants.  
• FEMA, in cooperation with Building Code Consortium and state agencies, 
should develop a historical database and tracking information for all 
communities, with accessible information for 
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o Historical building code mapping for every community. Develop 
guidelines for code modifications. 
o Provide regulatory oversight of building codes with state agencies.  
• Require local accountability of land use and zoning utilizing risk 
assessments, and mitigate accordingly prior to development.  
• Communities must be required to provide insurance policies on any public 
infrastructure they would repair or replace, or forfeit as self-insured and 
assume possible loss of the damaged public infrastructure.   
• Develop state Risk Awareness and Adaptation Outreach Programs under 
the Climate Adaptation Oversight Committee to provide staff and 
allocation to the DCRA for continuity of national messaging and public 
outreach strategies. 
• Incentivize commercial insurers to work closely with the Climate 
Adaptation Oversight Committee to develop insurance policies that reward 
risk-conscious consumers based on climate from DCRA. Assist in creating 
a behavioral culture change in the United States about risk awareness.   
• Annually appropriate no less than $1 billion for climate adaptation and 
resilience initiatives to local jurisdictions (through reduction in annual oil 
subsidies).   
The United States has demonstrated over the course of her short nationhood to be 
a compassionate leader in times of difficult choices. Choices today will affect generations 
of Americans and all life on Earth. The U.S. is obligated to protect the citizens of this great 
nation by setting politics aside and focus on informed decisions. Recognition of impact 
from past actions is what every private and public sector program must do to remain 
relevant in today’s society. It is no less incumbent upon the U.S. government to do the 
same for the impacts of climate change.  The stakes are higher than ever and require 
competently focused leadership to do the right things to protect this great nation. 
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